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INTRODUCTION
The philosophy of Henri Bergson is primarily of
historical importance today.

Curiously, the man who cap-

tivated academic and popular audiences in France at the
turn of the century now, only forty years after the publication of his last major work, elicits the serious attention of only a handful of scholars.

However dramatic

and forceful his impact might have been, it seems in retrospect indeed short-lived.
Since Bergson so well understood that evolutionary
progress demands the continuous overcoming of old forms
and the creation of new, he would have been the last to
lament the fact that much of his work has been supplanted
by more advanced research and evidence.

Quite more dis-

turbing, however, would have been the realization that his
philosophy may have well been superseded before it was
fully understood.

The intent of this paper is to take up

at least one of the issues which is relatively unexplored
in the history of Bergsonian research and, by situating it
within the framework of his broader philosophical concerns,
to renew ap appreciation of Bergson's work and to underscore his historical importance as an early formulator of
contemporary questions.
1
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The problem of expression, which is the focus of
the present study, arises within the context of Bergson's
epistemological distinction between intellect and intuition.
His theory of knowledge, in turn, is rooted in his metaphysics of duration.

This vital interdependency of ideas

requires an elucidation of Bergson's duration theory before
proceeding to questions of knowledge and expression.

Chap-

ter I, therefore, reviews Bergson's metaphysics of duration
in order to justify and explain its application to consciousness and the external world.
Within the context of an enduring world, there are
two distinct ways in which the mind knows its objects.

First

of all, the intellect, which seeks a stable basis for action,
employs static conceptual representations to immobilize the
continuously moving and changing duree.

Intuition, on the

other hand, with no practical interest, dispenses with symbols and seeks a pure, immediate grasp of duration as duration.

This epistemological distinction between intellectual

and intuitive modes of knowing is the topic of Chapter II.
The question inevitably arises, however, as to what
forms of expression, if any, can adequately accomodate our
intuitive apprehensions.

When Bergson proposes that intui-

tion dispense with symbols, does this fact imply that immediate experience is wholly inexpressible and incapable of being communicated?

Chapter III takes up this problem and
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interprets Bergson's suggestion that the mind ''create supple,
mobile, almost fluid representations, always ready to mold
themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition."

Bergson

will further suggest that there are at least three forms of
human expression, namely language, music, and art, which are
capable of fluid representation and hence more accurate expression of the universal duree.
A final consideration is Bergson's recorrnnendation
that philosophy, particularly metaphysics, employ the intuitive method.

If philosophy proceeds by intuition and adopts

the fluid forms of expression appropriate to it, does it
thereby forfeit its cherished precision and rigor?

Chapter

IV explores the implications of Bergson's view for philosophical discourse and method.
At the outset of this paper, it should be carefully
noted that Bergson's philosophy of expression is a topic
which demands the synthesizing of fragmentary texts and

.

some venturesome interpretation in order to clarify and complete their meaning.

Bergson's theory of expression, to

some extent explicitly developed in his writings and to some
extent contributed by an illustration and elaboration of his
texts, is more susceptible to misinterpretation than it would
be if it involved textual exposition alone.
also has a more positive side.

But the project

However difficult the recon-

struction of Bergson's position might be, it is urged upon
us by the fact that some of his most provocative and

4

illuminating ideas are presented in embryonic form.

His

philosophy of expression, and in particular his notion of
fluid representation, are foremost among those ideas.

CHAPTER I
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BERGSON'S EPISTEMOLOGY
Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology are inseparable.

The justification of his metaphysics of duration

depends largely on the validity of his theory of intuition;
in turn, his basic distinction between intellectual and intuitive knowing is an outgrowth of the metaphysical assumption that reality is duration.

This radical interdependency

of metaphysical and epistemological concerns makes imperative a discussion of the salient features of Bergson's duration prior to an analysis of his theory of knowledge.

The

problem of expression, rooted as it is in Bergson's epistemology, cannot. be defined or explicated until the broader
framework of his metaphysics is before us.

Clearly, the

organic character of Bergson's thought demands such a detour.
The purpose of the present chapter is to offer a
descriptive analysis of the metaphysical principle of duration, showing its earliest use in reference to consciousness and its subsequent extension to include the external
world.

This examination of the duration theory, in addition

to showing the defensibility of his metaphysics, will also
enable us to formulate the problems of knowledge and
5
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expression to which it gives rise.
DURATION
Oddly enough, duration did not always enjoy the
status of a metaphysical principle in Bergson's philosophy.
Although the concept of duration was introduced in Bergson's
earliest work Time and Free Will (1889), it was discussed
principally as a feature of consciousness with no clear
application to the external world. 1 The first indication
that Bergson was working toward a theory of the duration of
matter appeared in Chapter IV of Matter and Memorl (1896). 2
Although duration received explicit formulation as a metaphysical principle as early as 1902 in Introduction to
MetaEhlsics, the problem of proving the duration of matter

1Although Bergson does make reference to the external world in Time and Free Will, it is always with a
view to contrasting it with conscious duration. His
consistent aim is to show that duration only describes
consciousness, since it is innnaterial, unextended and nonspatial, whereas it does not describe matter which is extended and spatial with all that implies. It is therefore
curious that Mil·ic Capek maintains that as early as Bergson's Essai the problem of psychological time begins to
merge with the problem of duration in general. Milic Capek,
Bergson and Modern Phzsics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. VII Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1971),
p. 89.
2Prior to Chapter IV Bergson does make two brief
allusions to the fact that matter, particularly the body,
is in process of duration. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory,
trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul an.d W. Scott Palmer (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co~, 1959), pp. 178, 192. This
theory is not thoroughly nor systematically developed, however, until the final chapter.
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continued to preoccupy Bergson throughout Duration and
Simultaneity (1922) and The Creative Mind (1934).

Since

duration achieved its metaphysical stature only gradually as
Bergson's thesis advanced, it is necessary to trace the twofold development of the duration of consciousness and the
external world in order to arrive at its essential meaning.
Prior to this discussion, however, let us review
the main lines of the general theory of duration.

Bergson

consistently argues that there are two distinct ways in
which the mind can conceive of time.

On the one hand, time

can be regarded as a "pure duration," a temporal flow entirely free of space; on the other hand, it can be considered a homogeneous or "spatialized" time, a temporality
defined according to spatial categories and made dangerously
analogous to space itself. 3 This contrast invites analysis

3 Bergson's distinction between the two temporalities
is most explicit in the following texts: Time and Free Will,
trans. by F. L. Pogson, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper
and Row, 1960), pp. 99-100, 137-39; Matter and Memory, pp.
272-73; Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell, The
Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1944), pp. 366-70;
Duration and SimultaneitZ, trans. by Leon Jacobson, The
Library of Liberal ArtsNew York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965),
pp. 49-51; The Creative Mind (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield,
Adams and Co., 1970), pp. 12-13, 124. A lucid presentation
of these two views of time and a discussion of them in terms
of modern physics is contained in an article by Satosi
Watanabe, "The Concept of Time in Modern Physics and Bergson's Pure Duration" in Ber son and the Evolution of Ph sics,
ed. by P. A. Gunter (Knoxvi e: T e University o Tennessee
Press, 1969), pp. 62-76. Unquestionably the most substantial
and extensive treatment of the topic is found in two books
by Milic Capek: Bergson and Modern Physics and The Philoso hical Im act of Contem orar Ph sics (Princeton, N.J.:
D. Van Nostran Co.,
1 .
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of the concepts of space, homogeneous time and pure duration.

We will proceed, first of all, by defining "space"

which is the pivotal concept in Bergson's distinction of
the two temporalities;

secondly, by characterizing that

form of temporality which is an admixture of space and time
and, as such, is an unfortunate and distortive representation of duration; and finally, by describing pure duration
or "real time," which is Bergson's key metaphysical principle.
Bergson defines space quite simply as "an empty
homogeneous medium," homogeneity consisting in "the absence
of every quality. ,.4
assumption.

There are several consequences of this

First of all, in space one distinguishes objects

not on the basis of their qualitative differences-for space
assumes the complete absence of quality-but on the basis of
the positions of the objects relative to one another.

In

order to differentiate in this manner, the objects must be
present simultaneously. 5 It is then the spatial intervals
between the simultaneously existing objects that make possible discrimination among them, even if the objects in question

4 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 95, 98, 120-21.
5This concept of the simultaneous presence of objects in space is a subtle intrusion of time into the consideration of space. Appreciating that simultaneity fuses
space and time, Bergson says that "the connecting link between these two terms, space and duration, is simultaneity,
which might be defined as the intersection of time and
space." Time and Free Will, p. 110.
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are qualitatively undifferentiated or identical in nature. 6
A necessary condition for differentiating

coexistent ob-

jects is the perception of them as circumscribed or spatially delimited in themselves and separated by a spatial
interval from other objects.

These spatial intervals can
be measured and infinitely divided; 7 the objects which they
separate can, by virtue of their externality, be counted. 8
Thus space introduces quantity into the world of objects
and enables us to perceive them "all at once" as a multiplicity of discrete units in juxtaposition to one another. 9
In summary, space is an empty, homogeneous medium in which
simultaneously existing objects become separated, differentiated, juxtaposed and enumerated.

So described, space ac-

counts at least in part for the relations among objects in
the material world.

611 Space is what enables us to distinguish a number
of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another;
it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that
of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a
reality with no quality . . . because we afterwards interpret this difference of quality as a difference of situation, it follows that we must have a clear idea of a homogeneous medium, i.e., of a simultaneity of terms which,
although identical in quality, are yet distinct from one
another." (Time and Free Will, p. 95)
7Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 246-53, 273, 290;
Creative Evolution, pp. 335-36.
8 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 78-79, 85, 87,
99; Creative Evolution, pp. 280-81.
9Time and Free Will, pp. 120-21, 162-63; Duration
and Simultaneity, p. 60 .

..,....

.
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Bergson severely criticizes the theory of time
advanced by classical physicists and generally accepted by
common sense, for surreptitiously introducing space into
the temporal process. 10 Homogeneous time is nothing but
the projection of time into space, with the result that we
unwittingly fall back upon space and really give up time. 11
Bergson argues that when the temporal process is regarded
as a one-dimensional homogeneous medium, it must be "given
all at once," which amounts to saying that we abstract it
from duration. 12 It is "given all at once" in the sense
that it is viewed as a totality, a completed process in
which the past and future coexist with the present, and in
which discrete events appear in the order of their succession.

In isolating these successive states, we have in

10 c1assical physics developed from the Newtonian
mechanics. It persisted through the nineteenth century
generally evolving toward a corpuscular-kinetic scheme in
which the universe was regarded as "an enormous aggregate
of bits of homogeneous material whose quantity remained
constant while the spatial distribution was continuously
changing according to the immutable laws of mechanics."
(Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics,
p. 6) The emergence of the theory of relativity and
quantum mechanics in the early part of this century necessitated radical changes in the concept of space, time,
motion, and matter and formed the foundation of modern
physics. The philosophical import of this contrast between
classical and modern physics is the topic of Capek's book.
11 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 98. Cf. pp. 99,
101; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 52-53.
12 Time and Free Will, p. 98.
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effect demarcated moments in time, separated them by ternporal intervals, and externalized them in relation to one
another.

Thus we have created a series of static units

which can be counted and quantified like objects in space. 13
Furthermore, placing these units in succession introduces
order, and ordering requires that we first distinguish and
compare the terms ordered.
Hence we must perceive them as multiple, simultaneous
and distinct; in a word we set them side by side, and
if we introduce an order in what is successive, the
reason is that succession is converted into simultaneity and is projected into space.14
In making an order of succession, we are led to the
linear model and its implicit spatiality.

When time is re-

presented as a line extended in space, its duration is marked
by a series of individual instants strung along the continuum.15

This linear representation renders homogeneous time
as infinitely divisible as space. 16 In order to conceive
time as a continuum, we must have before us, all at once,

13 Time and Free Will, pp. 104-05, 123-24; Introduction to-MetaphySics:-t"rans. by T. E. Hulme, The Library
of Liberal Arts (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955), pp.
43-44; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 49 51; Creative
Mind, p. 12.
14 Time and Free Will, p. 102.
15 Ibid., pp. 103, 181-82, 237; Creative Evolution,
pp. 335-39; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 50-51, 53, 66;
Creative Mind, p. 12.
16 See n. 8.

...
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the past, present and future.

When they are mapped out

as discrete points along a line, they become simultaneous.
Duration is eclipsed, for past, present and future do not
unfold but are already given.

The uninterrupted and con-

tinuous process of time is reduced to a string of simultaneities, and its passage is marked by advancing from one
static point to the next.

Therefore, the major consequence

of viewing time as a homogeneous medium is that it acquires
all the characteristics that homogeneity implies, and becomes scarcely distinguishable from space itself.

Homo-

geneous time, as the movement through a linear succession
of discrete, static instants, has forfeited its essential
temporality and has more resemblance to space than to any
enduring process.
In order to correct this misconception of time,
Bergson introduces the notion of "real time" or pure duration, a temporality entirely free of space and all that its
homogeneity entails.

Its essential features are described

in the following passage in 1:vhich Bergson draws an analogy
between pure duration and a musical tune. 17 Although strictly speaking music is a succession oi notes,
Might it not be said that, even if these
one another, yet we perceive them in one
that their totality may be comparecr-to a
whose parts, although distinct, permeate

notes succeed
another, and
living being
one another .

17 The full implications of Bergson's frequent use
of music as an analogue will be discussed in Chapter III .
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We can thus conceive of succession without distinction,
and think of it as a mutual tenetration, an interconnexion and organization of e ements, each one of which
represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or
isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is
the account of duration which would be given by a being . . . who had no idea of space.18
The contrast with homogeneous time is clear.

The unity of

duration is organic; it resides in the continuity of the
process itself and not in the proximity in space or juxtaposition along a continuum of discrete elements.

The endur-

ing process gradually unfolds and thereby "hinders everything from being given 'all at once. 11119 Just as in a melody,
there is no clear definition of the point where one note
ends and another begins, so in duration one moment flows
into the next, resulting in a "mutual penetration" of ele1120 s.ince dura t.ion
.
. h out d.istinction.
.
.
ments, a " succession
wit
is a thoroughly continuous and indivisible process, there
are no isolable "states," no discrete "befores and afters,"
. 1 taneous instants.
.
21
no simu

Rather the past-flows-into-the-

18 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 100-01.

Italics

mine.
19 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 93.
20 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 107, 110, 237;
Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 26-~7.
21 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 272; Creative
Mind, pp. 142-50, 15).

14
present-becoming-future with no halts and no clear demarca.
.
1 s. 22
tion
o f interva

One effect of this radical continuity is that time
is essentially cumulative. 23 Each "moment" or event carries
with it what preceded and anticipates whatever follows.
With this prolongation of each "moment" into the next, the
past survives in the present and moves with it into the
future.

Since duration is cumulative, each successive

moment, preceded by a more amplified past, is an "uninterrupted upsurge of novelty. 1124 The "succession" of moments
is unrepeatable, and the entire process is irreversible. 25

22

Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26;
trans. by H. W. Carr (New York: Henry Holt
and Co.,20), p. 39; Creative Mind, pp. 16, 93, 296-97.
Bergson's use of the term "duration" to designate the
continuous movement of time contrasts sharply with another
conventional usage in which "duration" refers to what is
lasting or permanent, and therefore atemporal. J. J. C.
Smart, in a recent article on "Time" (The Encyclo¥edia of
Philosophy, 1st ed., VIII, 126-34), is critical o the
meaning Bergson intends because it is "heavily infected
with the myth of passage~"
23 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 209; Introduction to Meta~hysics, pp. 26, 40; Creative Evolution,
pp. 7-10, 20, 5 -53, 393; Mind-Energy, pp. 62-72; Duration
and Simultaneity, pp. 48-49; Creative Mind, p. 153.
24 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 18.
Mind-Ener~~·

25 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 8-9, 52, 91-93,
105, 237-38, 369-70; Creative Mind, pp. 18-19, 91-106.
For an extended discussion of the compatibility of continuity and novelty in Bergson's duree, see the article
by Guy LaFrance, "Continuite et absolue nouveate dans la
duree bergsonienne," Dialogue, VII (1968-69), pp. 94-101.
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If each moment is non-identical with every other, then
duration is a process of continuous change and is fundamentally heterogeneous. 26 In order to ensure the continuity
of duration in the midst of this incessant novelty and
change, it is necessary to perceive that change is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature.

Since quanti-

tative differentiation involves isolating and enumerating
discrete instants, it clearly violates this principle of
temporal continuity.

A differentiation on the basis of

quality, however, involves the perceiving of variations
which occur as "states" continuously blend and interpenetrate, without the necessity of separating or counting
27 The flow of duration is, then,
. 1 y in
. d ivi
. . d ua 1 units.
.
strict
an uninterrupted process of qualitative change.

As Bergson

summarily states, "duration properly so called has no
moments which are identical or external to one another,
being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no

26 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 104-05, 120, 235.
In his objection to Bergson's identification of duration
with the interpenetration of qualitative moments, Andrew
Reck argues that the notion of interpenetration demands a
"real distinctness" of qualities. He seems unaware of the
subtle difference between things being distinguishable and
things being separate. See Andrew Reck, "Bergson"s Theory
of Duration," Tulane Studies in Philosophy, VIII (1959),
pp. 30-31.
27 Ibid.
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analogy to number. 1128
Duration of Consciousness
Bergson most frequently discusses the theory of
duration, not as a general formula abstracted from things
29
.
. h en d ure, b ut in
. terms o f spec1"f•1c rea l"1t1es.
wh 1c

His

initial and most persistent focus is the duration of consciousness, which serves as the prototype for everything
that endures. 30 In what manner and on what grounds does
Bergson ascribe this pure duration to consciousness?
Bergson answers the first of these questions much more
readily than the second.
The essential feature of duration is its continuity,
and what accounts for continuity on the level of conscious

28 Time and Free Will, p. 120. Cf. Time and Free
Will, p. 104; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26.
2911 Pure duration" does not therefore refer to an
abstract, wholly theoretical concept but rather to a
temporality which is free from spatial intrusions and
consequently "pure 0" See ~~~~_!'._!:.-:_and Memory, pp. 280-81.
30 Bergson uses the terms "consciousness" (la
conscience) and "mind" (l'esprit) synonymously. Consciousness includes whatever activities or functions come within
the province of the mental life. The only exception to
this occurs in Creative Evolution, where Bergson makes
consciousness coextensive with life. This unusual usage
of the term is restricted to that work and peculiarly
suited to its purposes. When Bergson employs "consciousness" in its narrower, more common meaning, he uses the
term "conscious duration," "psychic duration," and "inner
duration" as virtually equivalent. See Time and Free Will,
pp. 75-139. They will also be used interchangeably in
this paper.

17
life is memory.

"There is no consciousness without memory,"

Bergson maintains,
and no continuation of a state without the addition to
the present feeling, of the memory of past moments.
It is this which constitutes duration. Inner duration
is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the
past into the present, the present either containing
within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing
image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its
continual change of quality the heavier and still
heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this survival of the past into the present there
would be no duration, but only instantaneity.3 1
Memory accounts for both the continuity of the temporal
flow as well as for the change and novelty which constitute
its heterogeneity.

Memory ensures continuity by its pro-

longation of the past into the present, by its "continuation
of what no longers exists into what does exist. 1132 Stimulated by the present moment, memory recalls the past and,
in doing so, induces an interpenetration of the past and
present.

While Bergson frequently refers to conscious

states as an "enduring multiplicity," it is clearly a "multiplicity without divisibility. 1133 Memory achieves the
mingling of past and present, the qualities of the former

31 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40. Cf.
Matter and Memory, pp. 80-81, 120, 131-32, 148, 188, 29497, 315-18; Creative Evolution, pp. 7-10, 20, 232; MindEner~y, pp. 7-8, 68; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 44,
48-4 ; Creative Mind, pp. 153-55.
32 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, p. 49.
33 Ibid., p. 44.

Cf.

Time and Free Will, p. 101.
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shading and blending with the latter.

Time, then, is

thoroughly continuous for "the preservation of the past
in the present is nothing else than the indivisibility of
change. 1134
If "duration is the continuous progress of the past
which gnaws into the future and swells it as it advances,"
then "consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. 113 5
Duration is cumulative with the effect that its "multiplicity of states" are heterogeneous, and the entire process
which is continually amplifying, is also continuously changing.

Consciousness
cannot remain identical with itself for two consecutive
moments, because the second moment always contains, over
and above the first, the memory that the first has bequeathed to it. A consciousness which could experience
two identical moments is a consciousness without
memory.36

Each state in the progress of conscious life is new, and
consequently the enduring process itself is irreversible. 37
At the same time, "duration is continuous since no state
begins or ends, but all ~xtend into each other. 1138
Bergson's justification for the fact that consciousness endures in this manner is never systematically set

34 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 155
35 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 7, 8.
36 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26
37 Bergson, Creative Evoluti<_?E~· pp. 8, 20.
38 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphy~ics, p. 25.

19
out.

There are at least three arguments, however, which

occur repeatedly in his work and merit attention.

First

and most naively, Bergson insists that consciousness has
an immediate apprehension of its own duration as it is
simply "felt" and "lived. 1139 Until this immediate apprehension is brought to the level of reflection and more
firmly substantiated, it can be readily disputed by the
rival claim of those who argue that they do not "feel" or
"live" the duration of their own consciousness. 40 Second,
Bergson's previously stated assumption that "there is no
consciousness without memory" becomes significant when
coupled with the additional

claim~amply

illustrated

above~

that memory both accomplishes and expresses the indivisible
continuity of the enduring process.

If consciousness is

essentially memory, and memory ensures duration, then any
existent consciousness must endure.

39 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 194, 196-97;
Matter and Memor~, pp. 191, 272; Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 49- O; Creative Evolution, p. 53; MindEnergi, p. 179; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 49, 62;
Creative Mind, p. 13. See Creative Mind p. 32 for a
succinct statement of how this immediacy will be accomplished on the reflective level through intuition.
40 This objection is raised by Hugh S. R. Elliot,
Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 64, 65.
Unfortunately, Elliot sees only this one aspect of Bergson's
theory of immediacy and therefore discredits it as having
no epistemological significance.

20

The third argument, however, is clearly the most
decisive.

Not only is it the most explicit and consistent

that Bergson advances in support of his thesis, but it reveals how radically dependent his metaphysics is upon his
theory of knowledge.

In brief, the argument is this.

The

very nature and existence of duration is proved mainly by
the fact that it is capable of being perceived. 41 If one
perceives one's own conscious life by means of the intellect,
then one imposes the categories of space and sees only a
homogeneous time and not a pure duration.

If one perceives

consciousness by means of intuition, then one apprehends it
immediately, without the interposing of spatial concepts,
and sees it as the pure temporality or pure duration that
it is.

While this theory clearly demands a thorough inves-

tigation~a

ter~let

task which is reserved for the following chap-

it suffice to say here that Bergson's theory of

duration is grounded subjectively in the ability of consciousness to employ intuition in its own self-apprehension.
Before taking up this crucial issue, we must conclude our
exposition of the duration theory.
Duration of the External World
If duration

ts

going to attain the status of a

metaphysical principle as Bergson clearly intends, it must

41 Bergson, Time and Free
Matter and Memory, pp. 280-293.

Wil~,

pp. 193, 223-24;

p
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be constitutive not only of consciousness but of the bodies
and other material objects which comprise the external
world.

But when Bergson sets out to establish the enduring

character of the external world, a task which he understandably postpones, he is faced with a rather impressive
difficulty.

As noted above, Bergson describes the duration

of consciousness as a pure ternporality, free of space and
extension and free of all homogeneity.

What does Bergson

do, however, when he comes to external objects which are,
by virtue of their rnaterialiti, extended and situated in
space?

Clearly, the tenability of his metaphysics of

duration will depend upon his ability to account for the
duration of material objects.
Bergson's changing position on the question of the
duration of matter indicates how very troublesome and cornplex an issue he found it to be.

In his first work, Time

and Free Will, Bergson argues on behalf of the duration of
consciousness but largely ignores the problem of the duration of matter.

His assumption is simply that, since

matter occupies space, material objects exhibit a "mutual
externality without succession," and not the "succession
without mutual externality" which characterizes the duration
of consciousness. 42 In Matter and Memory, however, Bergson
begins to modify this absolute dichotomy between the spatial

42 Time and Free Will, p. 227.

Cf. pp. 99, 108.
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and non-spatial, between matter and mind, and affirms the
fundamental temporality of the physical world. 43 Although
Creative Evolution basically supports the thesis that
matter endures, there are also numerous passages which are
regressive in characterizing matter as inertia, which interrupts and divides the otherwise continuous flux of the
real. 44 The final resolution of these difficulties in
Creative Evolution, together with the arguments in Duration
and Simultaneity (1922) and the two essays "Introduction I
and II" (1922), confirms that in Bergson's mature thought
matter is as integral to the universal d~ree as consciousness itself.

Let us now analyze his specific arguments.

Bergson establishes the duration of matter on two
separate grounds.

Bergson's first argument, based upon the

nature of matter itself, contends that matter is actually
the continuous and indivisible movement of dynamic "centers
of force" and not an inert substance which is readily divisible into discrete and separate units.
argument is based on

Bergson's second

his theory of consciousness.

Bergson

claims that the duration of matter is modeled on conscious

43 capek, Bergson and Modern Physics, p. 91. "In
Matter and Memory, however, this untenable dualism of the
temporal mind and timeless matter was given up, since
becoming was reinstated into the physical realm." Cf. p.
189.
44 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 169, 220, 240,
280-84, 294.
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duree, and that there are specific experiences of consciousness which will attest to that fact.

A more thorough ex-

amination of these two arguments will show that, whether
Bergson's point of departure is matter or consciousness,
his case finally comes to rest on a theory of conscious
perception.

Once again, it is clear that Bergson's meta-

physics of duration depends for its validity on his theory
of knowledge.
Bergson's concept of matter, which is by common
consent one of the most ill-defined and vague aspects of
his metaphysics, affirms the continuous mobility and essential temporality of the physical world.

In Matter and

Memory, where Bergson comes closest to advancing a

coherent
position, matter is defined as "an aggregate of images, 1145
the basic function of an image being to receive and give
back movement. 46 The material universe is therefore com-

posed of numerous "centers of force" which are continuously
moving and being moved by one another. 47 This uninterrupted
process of reciprocal action testifies to the fundamental
duration, continuity and indivisibility of matter.
In order for interactions to occur, matter must be
deployed in time.

The "fundamental law of matter," Bergson

45 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 5, 8, 26, 43.
46 rbid., pp. 4-5.
47 rbid., p. 26.
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explains, is "to reply to an action received by an immediate
reaction which adopts the rhythm of the first and continues
it in the same duration, to be in the present and in a present which is always beginning again. ,AB

The interactions

among its "centers of force" enable matter to be sustained
in the present and prolonged into the future.

Movement

requires time, and the reciprocal motion which constitutes
matter accounts for its temporal endurance.

The dynamical

organization of matter at once presumes and ensures its
duration. 49
Although perilously close to the atomism he criticizes, Bergson's theory differs from classical atomism insofar as it does not isolate its constitutive elements.
Bergson states in Matter and

As

Mem~£Y_,

We may still speak of atoms; the atom may even retain
its individuality for our mind which isolates it; but
the solidity and inertia of the atom dissolve either
into moverrents or into line::; of force whose reciprocal
solidarity bri ··gs back to us universal continuity. 50
Although Bergson speaks of matter in terms of atomistic
elements, he hastens to add that their incessant interaction

48

M~tt.2r a!!~Merl!~~EX· p.

279.

49 There is every indication that duration, whether
of consciousness or of matter, has basically the same
feat1:1'res.
(Cf. Capek, ~rg.son ?_"?;d Modern.Physics, p. 191~
In discussing the duration ofiliatter, however, Bergson fails
to touch upon all of the characteristics applied to conscious
duration. This is yet another indication of his obscuring
the theory of matter.
50 Bergson, Matter and Mem9ry, p. 265.

-·-----...
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achieves a "reciprocal solidarity," making matter itself
continuous and indivisible.
the solar system.

Bergson offers the example of

"Our sun radiates heat and light beyond

the farthest planet and

. our entire solar system is
moving in a definite direction as if it were drawn. 1151
There is, Bergson insists, a "bond between the worlds. 1152
The thread attaching the sun to the rest of the universe
is doubtless very tenuous. Nevertheless it is along
this thread that is transmitted down to the smallest
particle of the world in which we live the duration
immanent in the whole of the universe.53
Moreover,
if there is a truth that science has placed beyond
dispute, it is that of the reciprocal action of all
parts of matter upon each other. Between the supposed molecules of bodies the forces of attraction
and repulsion are at work. The influence of gravitation extends throughout interplanetary space.54
Even in the outer reaches of space where bodies seem most
separate and indifferent, there is a bond of active forces
between them.

Matter exhibits a continuity of interactions,

an interpenetration of its "centers of force," which cannot
properly speaking be divided.

Any interpretation of matter

as absolutely divisible, as composec of strictly delimited

51 Bergson, Creative Ev::>lut~on, p. 263.
52 Ibid.
53 rbid., p. 14.
54 Bergson, ~atter and Memory, p. 264.
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bodies isolated in themselves and external to one another,
could only be a consequence of a mind which immobilizes the
activity it perceives and divides what is continuous.

Any

interpretation of matter as inert, discontinuous or divisible is an effect of conscious perception and not a description of matter itself.
The main force of Bergson's argument, whether it
takes matter or consciousness as its starting point, hinges
on the theory that conscious perception both hinders and
facilitates our view of matter as an uninterrupted mobility
and duration.

First of all, we are hindered by the twofold

tendency of the mind to immobilize and divide what it perceives.

The mind's tendency to render its objects immobile

is due in part to the nature of the intellect itself, which
seeks what is inert and unchanging in whatever it perceives,
with the result that it can comprehend movement only in
terms of static points through which the moving object
passes, and can understand duration only in terms of the
progress from one static instant to the next. 55 On the
other hand, we tend to immobilize external objects because
their rhythm of duration may differ from ours, becoming
either so rapid or so slow as to seem motionless. 56 Our

55Matter and Memory, pp. 275-76, 278, 305; Creative
Evolution, pp. 327-28; Creative Mind, pp. 14-15, 70.
56 There are several passages where Bergson speaks
of the different rhythms of duration (Matter and Memory,.
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perception of matter as inert and unchanging is due to our
habitual tendency to view objects relative to our own ternporal rhythm.
Once matter is immobilized, it then becomes readily
divisible into independent objects.

Although Bergson ac-

knowledges that we do legitimately discriminate among material objects, he consistently denies that they are in reality
absolutely separate.
That there are, in a sense, multiple objects, that one
man is distinct from another man, tree from tree, stone
from stone, is an indisputable fact: for each of these
beings, each of these things has characteristic properties and obeys a determined law of evolution. But the
se aration between a thin and its environment cann~
e a so ute y e 1n1te an c ear cut; t ere is a passage by insensible gradations from the one to the other:
the close solidarity which binds all the objects of the
material universe, the perpetuity of their reciprocal
actions and reactions, is sufficient to prove that they
have not the precise limits which we attribute to
them.57
Bergson's explanation of our tendency to divide the indivisible is, once again, that "the primary and most important

pp. 75, 275-76, 279; Introc!_uc~ion_!9_Metap}~sics, p. 47;
Duration and Simultaneity, p. SI). Consequently, if something moves at a speedrar exceeding our cwn, the speed of
light for example, we perceive its effect:; as colors which
are stable. Similarly, if something changes so slowly as
to be imperceptible, the gradual wearing and aging of a
rock for example, then it seems changeless. For further
illustrations, see H. Wildon Carr, !ienri Bergson: The
Philoso~hy of _Change (London:
T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1919),
pp. 38- 9.
57 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 277-78. Italics
mine.
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operation of the perceiving mind" is that "it marks out
divisions in the continuity of the extended, simply following the suggestions of our requirement and the needs of
practical life. 1158 In order to so divide matter, the mind
projects beneath the continuous mobility of the real an
infinitely divisible substratum of homogeneous space. 59

We

then are able to employ the linear model and mark out points
in space which represent independent objects. 60
What
prompts our division of the world in this manner is the
urgency of our own biological needs and the requirements
of action. 61 Unless objects are clearly set off from one
another, such practical, life-sustaining activities as
procuring food, seeking out what is useful and avoiding
what is harmful, become immensely difficult, if not impossible.

Needs are directed toward and satisfied by specific

types of objects and our ability to fulfill our needs
necessitates the delimiting and defining of those objects
within the environment. 62
As necessary as this capacity for immobilizing and

58 Matter and Memory, p. 278.
59 rbid., pp. 278, 280, 292.
60 rbid., p. 279.
61 rbid., pp. 261-62, 266, 280-82, 290; Creative
Evolution, pp. 173, 297.
62 Matter and Memory, pp. 261-62.
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dividing reality may be, Bergson laments that we confuse
our reinterpretation of matter for practical purposes with
the nature of matter itself. 63 Quite surprisingly, however,
Bergson recognizes that the mind's tendency to perceive
different rhythms of duration, which contributes to the immobilization of matter, also enables consciousness to grasp
matter's essential mobility and duration.

Furthermore,

Bergson goes beyond the naive assumption that consciousness
simply "feels" the duration of external objects, and suggests
that the mind, through intuition, can know an object "from
within" as the dynamical organization it is.

These are the

two basic arguments Bergson provides to establish the duration of matter from the viewpoint of consciousness.
The ability of consciousness to perceive different
rhythms of duration has important implications for the
duration of matter.

Bergson's argument originates in the

observation that "the states of our material world are contemporaneous with the history of our consciousness.

As the

latter endures the former must be bound in some way to real
duration. 1164 Bergson's classic example of "waiting for the
sugar to melt" illustrates this point.

63 Matter and Memor~, p. 262. "It is nothing, in
.
fact, but the ordinary con ition of useful action, unsuitably transported into the domain of pure knowledge."
64 Bergson, ·c reative
.
M"in d , p. 20 .
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If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must,
willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little
fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have
to wait . . . coincides with my impatience, that is
to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which
I cannot protract or contract as I like.65
The fact that consciousness waits on an event in the external world, indicates that things are accomplished, not
"all at once," but gradually in time.

Consciousness comes

to this realization when it is kept waiting, when the unfolding of things in time moves more slowly than the duration of consciousness.

By contrast with our own psychic

time, the temporality of the physical world announces itself
by progressing at a rhythm different from our own, but
neither too rapid nor too slow to be an imperceptible difference.

Thus, the selfsame ability of consciousness to

view the duration of material objects relative to its own
leads to a view of matter as inert and atemporal, and to
a view of matter as mobile and enduring.
A second proof for the duration of matter which
derives from consciousness is discussed in the famous example from Introduction to Metaphysics of an object moving
in space. 66 Bergson claims that the movement of an object
can be viewed in two ways:

either "relatively," from a

65 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 12-13:
Creative Mind, pp. 20-21, 33.
·--

Cf.

66Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22.
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perspective external to the object, or "absolutely" from
"inside" the moving object itself.

In the first instance,

the movement is calculated in terms of a series of points,
axes or other symbols of measurement.

In the second case,

such symbols are dispensable since the object is viewed
"from where it is, from within, as it is itself. 1167 The
former is the method of intellectual analysis, the latter
is the work of intuition.
The significance of this passage for the duration
of material objects is this.

Whether Bergson is discussing

the spatial or temporal movement of an object, he attributes
to the object an "inside" and an "outside."

This unfor-

tunately dualistic language serves more to obscure than to
clarify the point Bergson intends to make.

Bergson is not

speaking of two different kinds of objective reality, or
two different natures of a single object.

What is decisive

in this text is that what seems to be a metaphysical claim
is actually a statement about the ideal limits of perception.
"Inside" refers not to some mysterious region of being which
is different in nature from an outer strata, but to the
extent of the mind's penetration of the object and its
ability to see it as the temporally fluid and continuous
reality that it is.

Bergson avoids a metaphysical dualism,

as he consistently argues that the object or the so-called

67 rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 22.
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"absolute" is a "simple thing. 1168

It is possible, however,

to view this simple reality in-depth or superficially, from
the unmediated point of view of intuition or through the
mediating symbols which the intellect constructs and confuses with the reality itself.

He is speaking, then, not

of two realities, but of reality as viewed from two perspectives.
These two forms of knowledge, their limits and
possibilities, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter
II.

The point to be made here is that Bergson can without

contradiction affirm the duration of

exte~ded

material ob-

jects by appealing to the distinction, which is basically
an epistemological one, between the object as an absolutely
simple, enduring reality, and the object perceived as an
inert, discrete unit of matter.

If the mind, by means of

intuition, is capable of discerning material objects as
uninterrupted processes of movement in time, then the duration of matter is confirmed by the intuitive apprehension
of consciousness.
W:Lth the preceding argllments on behalf of the Jllration of matter, we have come full circle.
tended to show that "duration

Bergson has in-

. is the foundation of

our being, and . . . the very substance of the world in

68 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 23.
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which we live. 1169

In establishing his metaphysics of

duration, he has offered evidence for the duration of consciousness and the external world, for the continuous ternporality and mobility of mind and matter.

However con-

vincing these claims, our acceptance of his metaphysics
must be tentative to the extent that it is based on epistemological considerations.

The validity of the arguments

grounded in conscious perception will depend upon our findings in the critical examination of Bergson's theory of
knowledge.
Epistemological Implications of
Bergson's Metaphysics
The interdependency of Bergson's metaphysics and
theory of knowledge, remarked upon early in the discussion,
has now taken on a more specific sense.

It is clear from

the preceding analysis that the burden of proof for the
duration of consciousness and the external world falls to
Bergson's epistemology.

If the enduring character of reality

is confirmed by consciousness perceiving it as such, then
Bergson must explain the conditions for the possibility of
such knowledge.

Since this epistemology will be elaborated

r
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peculiar set of problems.

How can a reality in process of

continuous movement and change be known?

How does con-

sciousness which is itself temporal grasp external objects
which have different rhythms of duration?

In short, to

what extent does knowledge require stability in the knower,
in the known and in the relation between them?
Bergson's theory of intuition is an attempt to
justify and explain, on the cognitive level, how consciousness can have an immediate knowledge of duration as duration.

Whether or not duration can be known in its con-

tinuous temporal flow rests on the theory of intuition;
and since the knowability of duration is the major proof
Bergson offers for the fact that "reality endures," his
metaphysics finally depends on the strength of his epistemology.

That epistemology, in turn, must face the prob-

lems of a temporal consciousness striving for knowledge
within an enduring world.
In the following chapter, I will examine the basic
structure of Bergson's theory of
between intellect and intuition.

knowledge~the

distinction

In doing so, my interest

will be both retrospective and prospective.

On the one

hand, the discussion will bear in mind the critical role the
theory of knowledge, particularly intuition, plays in substantiating his metaphysics of duration.

On the other hand,

it shall anticipate the problem of expression which will
emerge from the theory of intuitive knowledge.

If Bergson
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is able to show that we can in fact cognitively apprehend
duration, then the problem arises as to what forms of expression, if any, will be adequate to this knowledge of a
fluid and mobile duree.

CHAPTER II
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE:

INTELLECT AND INTUITION

Any theory of knowledge makes certain presuppositions about the world, for in a very fundamental way our
methods of knowing structure the kind of world we see.
Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition,
which is the basis of his epistemology, rests upon this
assumption.

The method of intellectual analysis, employing

abstract and immobile symbolic representations, apprehends
static images rather than process, homogeneous time rather
than pure duration.

Intuition, on the other hand, dispenses

with symbols and gives us a direct, immediate grasp of
duration as duration.

Consequently, Bergson critizes the

methods of the intellect for obscuring duration, while he
recommends to our use intuition which discloses it.

The

nature and function of these two mental operations will be
analyzed in this chapter in the interest of substantiating
Bergson's metaphysics, and in the interest of taking up the
new questions to which the distinction gives rise.
At the outset it should be noted that intellect
and intuition are not diametrically opposed as is commonly
36
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assumed. 1

A careful reading of Bergson will indicate that

they are not separate faculties, but distinct, though complementary functions of the mind.
unquestionably the more general.

Of the two, intellect is
In a somewhat confusing

manner, Bergson uses the word "intellect" equivocally:

in

its broadest usage, it is synonymous with mind and encompasses all mental activity; in its more specific sense,
it is a specialized function of the mind which is set in
contrast to intuition.

While Bergson trades more heavily

on the second meaning, there are also several texts in which
intelligence is virtually equivalent to the mind itself.
Frequently, intuition is described as a function of the intellect; 2 Bergson even defines intuition as an "intellectual

1 Bergson, Mind-Energ~, pp. 34-35. Among the few
commentators to stress thisact are G. W. Cunningham, A
Study in the Philosophy of Berfson (New York: Longmans~
Green and Co., 1916) and Pete . Gunter, "Bergson's Reflective Anti-Intellectualism," Personalist, XLVII (1966), 4360. Of particular importance is Chapter III of Cunningham's
study, "Intuition and Intelligence" (pp. 32-64), in which
he defends the following thesis: "intuition involves
intellectual activity and transcends it, if at all, only as
a more comprehensive and concrete form of the same sort of
knowledge. From this point of view, 'there is no essential
difference between the intellect and this intuition itself.'" (p. 61) For a typical overstatement of the opposition between intelligence and intuition see Harold N. Lee,
"Bergson's Two Ways of Knowing," Tulane Studies in Philos~. VIII (1959), p. 49.
Lee's entire article is founded
on this misconception.
2Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 78-79. There are even
a few vague suggestions in Bergson's essay on "intellectual
effort" (Mind-Energy, pp. 210, 214) that the intellect
accomplishes work normally attributed to intuition. Cf.
Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 51.
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ausculation 113 or an "intellectual sympathy. 114

Bergson

also acknowledges the existence of intuition "around the
fringes of the intellect," further implying that it is an
auxiliary function of the more general capacity of intelligence. 5

Bergson maintains that intuition completes the

work of the intellect by disclosing the mobile aspect of
reality which it is incapable of grasping. 6

Mindful, then,

that Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition
does not suggest their absolute separation, let us analyze
their diverse but related funtions.
The Problems of Intellectual Analysis
The intellect, considered as a specific operation
of the mind, knows an object by means of analysis.

In

Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson describes the work of
analysis as the accumulation of multiple perspectives on an
object, the translation of them into conceptual representations, and the subsequent reconstruction of the object by
a synthesis of the points of view on~ has symbolized. 7 In

3 Bergson, Mind-Energy, pp. 36-37.
4 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 23-24,
51, 61.
5 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. xxiii, 53, 56,
211; Creative Mind, p. 80; The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion, trans. by F. L. Pogson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 212.
6creative Evolution, p. 195, 372-73.
7Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 24.
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examining our use of this method, Bergson finds that,
despite its practical value, it effects certain subtle distortions of the reality we are seeking to know.

At every

stage of the analytical process, the intellect exhibits two
main tendencies:

it retains only general aspects of any

concrete reality, and it takes only static views of its
enduring objects.

This generalization and immobilization

of reality Bergson traces to the conceptual representations
or symbols which are integral to the analytical method. 8
The perceptions from which the concept is derived, and the
linguistic, musical and artistic forms in which it is
expressed, are adapted to the concept and share its basic
tendencies.

Consequently, Bergson's critique of intellec-

tual analysis encompasses not only its cognitive processes
of perception and conception, but the expressive forms in
which these concepts are embodied.
The first stage of analysis, which is perception,
begins with the intellect taking a point of view on its

8

when Bergson employs the term "symbol," he intends
only its basically representative function. Although he
does make occasional mention of numerical symbolism (Time
and Free Will, pp. 78-79, 86-90, 119, 234; Matter and-Memory, p. 255; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 52;
Creative Evolution, pp. 230-31, 237; Creative Mind, pp.
12-13), his preoccupation is unquestionably with language.
In fact, as we shall subsequently see, his identification
of the concept with the word is so consistent and so strong
that his critique of concepts becomes, in effect, a critique
of language as well.
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object, 9 and then varying and multiplying successive points
.
.
.
.
. o b taine
. d . lO
o f view
un t i· 1 a series
o f impressions
is

There

are two aspects of this procedure which are especially
significant.

First of all, when consciousness observes an

object from a particular perspective, it must necessarily
adopt a position external to the object from which its
observation can be made.

Bergson argues that taking an

"outside" point of view precludes access to the object "from
where it is, from within, as it is in itself. 1111

To accum-

ulate perspectives around an object, Bergson maintains, is
not to "enter into it."

A second implication is that

points of view provide only glimpses or snapshots of the
reality perceived. 12 As Bergson will more amply illustrate
in his discussion of the concept, the collection of these
separate perspectives can never give more than a partial
and static view of the object.

Thus, even in the initial

9unless specifically indicated otherwise, this and
all subsequent uses of the word "object" denote its most
general meaning as anything which can be taken as an object
of knowledge, not just material or external objects.
10 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 24,
38.
11 rb;d.,
21 22 f
Cf. 38-39.
L
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12 rbid., pp. 24, 25. See also Matter and Memory,
p. 278. "Such is the primary and most apparent operation
of the perceiving mind: it marks our divisions in the continuity of the extended, simply following the suggestions
of our requirement and the needs of practical life."

-------
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act of perception, consciousness is situated outside its
object, viewing it from a series of fixed positions external to it.
In the second stage of analysis, the impressions
obtained in perception are translated by the intellect into
concepts. 13 Bergson broadly defines concepts as "abstract,
general, or simple ideas 1114 which are, in effect, "symbols
substituted for the object they symbolize. 1115

In serving

their representative functions, concepts "never actually
give us more than an artificial reconstruction of the
object, of which they can only symbolize certain general

13Although Bergson repeatedly alludes to the intellect as the concept-making faculty, he states so quite
explicitly in Creative Evolution, pp. xix,56.
Jean Theau, in his recent book La critique bergsonienne du concept (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1968), argues this thesis: "D'un bout a l'autre de son
(Bergson'aj ouevre, nous esperons le montrer, c'est sa critique de la pensee par concepts, laquelle engendrait une
nouvelle critique de l'intelligence." (p. 15) However promising Theau's topic, there are disappointing features of
its realization. First of all, Theau gives only casual
treatment to Bergson's Creative Mind and Introduction to
Metaphysics in deference to an exceedingly lengthy and
technical analysis of Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory,
Creative Evolution and Two Sources (p. 20). This selectiveness causes many of Bergsori'~s most lucid and summary statements on the concept to be overshadowed by the bulk of his
psychological and biological data, which lends them only
vague support. In addition, Theau's emphasis also results
in a relatively sparse treatment of Bergson's innovative
notion of the "fluid concept." Secondly, Theau's study has
its stylistic difficulties. It frequently suffers from
verbosity, grandiloquence and a devotional tone.
14 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 27.
15 Ibid., p. 28.
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and, in a way, impersonal aspects. 1116

Bergson explains

that a concept grasps only the general features of an
object since it
retains only that part of the object which is conrrnon
to it and to others, and expresses . . . a comparison
between the object and others which resemble it . . . .
The concept can only symbolize a particular property
by making it common to an infinity of things. It
therefore always more or less deforms the property by
the extension it gives to it . . . . Thus, the different concepts that we form of the properties of the
thing inscribe around it so many circles, each much
too large and none of them fitting it exactly.17
The generality of the concept to which Bergson refers is
familiar.

Since concepts are, at least in principle,

applicable to more than one object, they must be sufficiently general to include all the particulars which share
in their meaning.

Understandably, the broader the extension

of the concept, the more general and diluted its meaning
becomes. 18 What is perhaps less commonly observed is that
this generality does a disservice to the object it represents.

For example, when the word "red" is applied to a

particular item, it implies that its color is comparable
to the red of other things.

Although this particular shade

of red may be quite distinctive, the
liver its uniqueness.

conce~t

does not de-

When we attempt to solve the problem

16 rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 29.
17 rbid., pp. 28-29. Cf. 22, 37.
18 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 49.
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by inventing intermediary concepts, such as scarlet,

bur-

gundy or vermilion to express these subtle variations, we
simply prolong the difficulty.

Each of these concepts in

turn encompasses different shades of scarlet or burgundy.
So even if we specify gradations indefinitely, we can never
eradicate the essential generality of the concept. 19 Thus,
although Bergson will admit that the concept exhibits remarkable versatility by being employable in a variety of
contexts and in reference to numerous objects, 20 he also
sees that its extension has the serious disadvantage that
the concept is always "too large," too imprecise, too abstract to disclose the novel or distinctive features of a
concrete, particular object. 21
Another even more serious limitation of the concept
is its tendency to immobilize and divide its objects.

Con-

cepts, like the perceptions from which they are derived, are
only so many snapshots of reality which, however diligently
they are accumulated, remain only motionless and partial
views of the object they symbolize. 22 In conceptualizing

19 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 28, 39.
20 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 174-77. See
Theau, La critique bergsonienne du concept, pp. 445-46.
21 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 28;
Creative Mind, pp. 34-35, 95; Creative Evolution, p. 180.
22 Bergson explains the static nature of concepts by
the fact that the intellect is modeled on inert matter,
rather than on living, dynamic realities.
(Creative Evolution, pp. 177, 216-17, 225, 273, 281; Creative Mind, pp.
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our own conscious life, for example, the intellect marks
out "states" and "sensation," designates them by separate
concepts, and then attempts to recreate the continuity of
conscious life by combining the different concepts. 23
Similarly, we distinguish objects in the continuous flow
of matter by demarcating their boundaries with separate concepts. 24

We further divide these individual objects by

.
th em d own into
.
.
b rea k ing
numerous qua l"ities
an d attri"bu t es. 25
Thus, whether the intellect employs concepts to divide
reality itself into consciousness and matter, 26 or consciousness into states, or matter into things, or things
into attributes, the effect is always to decompose what is
whole and continuous into parts which are discrete and
stable.

38-39, 42-43) Just as the material world "presents to us
objects external to other objects, and, within these objects, parts external to parts," (Creative Evolution, p.
169), so concepts "are outside each other, like objects in
space; and they have the same stability as such objects on
which they have been modeled." (Creative Evolution, p. 177).
23 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 162-64, 167, 196;
Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40; Mind-Energy, p. 179;
Creative Evolution, pp. 5-7, 281, 297; Creative Mind,
p. 95.
24 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 170-71, 245, 293;
Creative Evolution, pp. 297, 328; Creative Mind, pp. 34-35.
25 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphrsics, pp. 30, 44;
Creative Evolution, pp. 228, 326-27. Itollows that the
more subdivisions the intellect makes, the more complexity
it finds in the object.
26 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 190-91.
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The third stage of analysis is the intellect's
effort to recompose the fullness and fluidity of the object
by gathering together the concepts into which it has been
divided and solidified. 27 Bergson argues that once an
object is dissected conceptually, it cannot be grasped as
unified and entire simply by combining the various concepts
which describe it.

Even if concepts are multiplied, their

inherent generality prevents them, either individually or
collectively, from seizing the particular. 28 Amassing generalities does not account for the move beyond the general
toward the concrete, individual object.

Furthermore, the

accumulation of static and partial conceptions in an effort
to seize the enduring object is equally unsuccessful.

The

problem of collecting a set of inert concepts is analogous
to stringing together motionless points in order to conceive movement.

As discussed in Chapter I, however numerous

the points on a line and however minute the intervals between them, a series of immobilities will never disclose

27 rn Creative Evolution Bergson indicates the
intellect's "unlimited power of decomposing according to
any law and of recomposing into any system." (p. 173)
28 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 22.
Bergson also suggests here that only when these general
concepts are grasped intuitively can they lead to a knowledge of the particular object. It should be carefully
noted that this is not a function of the concepts themselves, but of the intuitive process which is auxiliary to
them.
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the uninterrupted progress of the moving object. 29 Movement slips through the intervals, 30 for at most one has
traced the path along which the object has passed, but not
the actual passing itself. 31 Similarly, any attempt to
reconstruct reality out of so many conceptual viewpoints is
bound to be inadequate.

In Creative Evolution, Bergson
compares the intellect to a cinematograph. 32 Just as the

I

unreeling of a film tries to simulate continuous action by
a rapid succession of discrete, motionless frames, so does
the intellect attempt to capture enduring objects by synthesizing stable conceptions of them.

What results is a

string of conceptual snapshots which give, at best, merely

29 I ntro duction
· .
.
to Metap hysics,
p. 42 . Cf. Chapter
I, pp. 11-12.
30 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 334.
31This was precisely the error of Zeno. If one
expresses movement as a series of points along a line, and
notes the progress of the moving object by marking its passage from point to point, there is nothing to prevent one
from inserting an infinite number of points along the course
through which the moving object must pass. Hence, with an
infinite number of points to be surpassed, the arrow will
never reach its target and Achilles will never pass the
tortoise.
(Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 111-115; Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22, 43-45; Creative Evolution, pp. 335 f.; Creative Mind, pp. 17, 144-45.) For an
extensive analysis of Bergson and the Eleatic paradox see
the essay by Harve Barreau, "Bergson et Zenon d'El~e: La
conception bergsonienne du mouvement et l'eleatisme," Revue
Philosophi3ue de Louvain, LXVII (May, August, 1969), 267-

84, 389-43 .

32 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 331-35, 339, 341,
354; Creative Mind, pp. 18, 93.

.........__
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the illusion of real duration.

Bergson's conclusion is

that concepts are, by their very nature, general and static
representations through which the particularity and continuity of reality always escapes.
If intellectual analysis does such a disservice to
the world in the process of perceiving and conceptualizing
it, what is it that recommends this method to our use?
Bergson's answer is simple.

While intellectual analysis

proves incapable of a pure, disinterested grasp of reality
as it is, it serves the very practical function of stabilizing and ordering the world to prepare it for action.

The

intellect adopts the analytical method in response to our
need to survive in a world of change, for analysis, step by
step, creates a stable conceptual framework in which to
harness the fluid world.

In Introduction to Metaphysics,

Bergson summarizes this work of the intellect:
the normal work of the intellect is far from being
disinterested. We do not aim generally at knowledge
for the sake of knowledge, but in order to take sides,
to draw profit~in short, to satisfy an interest. We
inquire up to what point the object we seek to know
is this or that, to what known class it belongs, and
what"k'Ind orB:Ction, bearing or attitude it should
suggest to us . . . . To try to fit a concept to an
object is simply to ask what we can do with the object, and what it can do for us. To label an object
with a certain concept is to mark in precise terms
the kind of action or attitude the object should suggest to us. All knowledge properly so called, is then
oriented in a certain direction or taken from a certain point of view.33

33 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 38-39.
Cf. Time and Free Will, pp. 129, 133-34, 138-39, 230-31,

-
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Clearly the aim of the intellect is

pragmatic~it

seeks to

know the world in order to determine the use to which it
might be put or the action we should adopt toward it.

The

point of view we take in perception betrays the particular
interest we have in the object.

Our subsequent conceptual-

izing of the object according to that point of view enables
us to identify, classify and order the random particulars
of experience, and to arrest their continuous mobility in
fixed, well defined concepts.

These efforts of the intel-

lect serve to orient us in the world and to give us a firm
basis for action.
So deeply ingrained is the need to falsify the
enduring world for our practical ends, that the tendencies
inherent in the cognitive process carry over to our modes
of expression as well.

Each of the three major expressive

forms, language, music and the visual arts, exhibit certain
characteristics which ally them to the process of intellectual analysis and open them to the same criticisms.
Language, which is the principal medium for the
expression of conceptual thought, inherits virtually all
the limitations of the concept due to the fact that, for

236-37; Matter and Memory, pp. 21, 33, 191, 241, 278, 3040~; Introduction to Meta¥hy~ics, pp. 45, 50; Creative Eyolution, pp. 173, 210, 214 ., 217, 296-97, 324, 332-33; MindEnergy, pp. 58, 71; Creative Mind, pp. 70, 78, 80; Two
Sources, pp. 253-54. Cf. Theau, La critique bergsonienne du
concept, p. 316.

I

~
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Bergson, the word is the concept expressed. 34

Like concepts,

words also suffer from being too general insofar as the
meaning they express is capable of encompassing several
particulars; 35 they are static, not only because of their
obvious rigidity in form, but also because of their relative
stability in meaning. 36 Furthermore, the word performs the
same ordering and abstracting function as its conceptual
counterpart, enabling us to manipulate the world of objects
and to create the network of social relations which is essential to most life-sustaining and productive activity. 37
Language, at least on the surface of things, seems to share
all the characteristics of the concepts it articulates.
Chapter III, however, will include a more penetrating discussion of language, not in terms of its appropriateness to
the analytical method, but in view of its adaptability to

34 see Chapter II, n. 8. While Bergson clearly
identifies the concept with the word, he never explicitly
addresses the question of whether thought is essentially
linguistic or whether it is possible to think in the
absence of language.
35 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 13, 132, 134-35,
160, 163-64; Mind-Ener~y, pp. 153, 156; Creative Evolution,
pp. 175-76; Creative Mind, pp. 55-56.
36 Time and Free Will, pp. ix, 129-32, 167, 196,
226-27, 239-40; Matter and Memor~, pp. 59, 154, 158-59,
239-40; Creative Evolution, pp.40, 354-55; Creative
Mind, pp. 14, 27, 35, 56, 69, 81. See Theau, La critique
oergsonienne du concept, pp. 445-46.
37 Time and Free Will, pp. 138-39, 231; Creative
Evolution, p. 289; Creative Mind, pp. 70, 80; Two Sources,
pp. 253-54, 275.
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an intuitive grasp of duration as duration.
Of lesser concern to Bergson are the expressive
forms of music and art.

While their detailed examination

will be undertaken in the next chapter, a preliminary observation to be made here is that both modes of expression
bear the stamp of the intellect by being essentially static
in form.

A musical score, for example, symbolizes the con-

tinuous temporal flow of musical sound by means of a succession of discrete notes on a line in space. 38 The limitations
of this symbolic form are analogous to those Bergson finds
in other linear models used to represent time or motion. 39
Whether a series of points is used to represent moments in
time, the positions of a moving object or notes in a musical
tune, the problem is that the extended line of inert points
is a spatial symbolism and, as such, is inadequate to convey a temporal process.

A musical score is a prime example

of this attempt to express time· spatially, and to reduce
its continuous movement to a succession of motionless points.
The visual arts of painting and sculpturing present
a similar problem.

As Bergson remarks in Time and Free Will,

''The plastic arts obtain an effect of the same kind by the

38 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 147-48. Bergson's
entire discussion of music turns on the distinction between
music as a written score and music as it is heard when performed. In the context of his theory of intellectual analysis, the first of these is most important.
39 see Chapter I, pp. 11-12.
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fixity which they suddenly impose upon life, and which a
physical contagion carries over to the attention of the
spectator. ,AO

Painting and sculpturing, which are intrin-

sically spatial, are composed of a juxtaposition of inert
visual forms.

The problem by now is familiar:

Bergson

suggests thatmotionless forms placed side by side in space
cannot adequately symbolize the uninterrupted duration of
things.

Furthermore, Bergson questions the ability of the

visual arts to represent an enduring object completely.

In

Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson cites the example of
an artist painting the Tower of Notre Dame in Paris.

How-

ever numerous the sketches, however varied the point of
view, the artist can never reconstruct the actual tower. 41
As Bergson argues elsewhere, numerous partial glimpses will
never, taken together, give the actual object in its entirety.

The plastic arts, then, employ static imagery which

arrests the fluid temporality of things and which offers
only a still glimpse or snapshot of its object, providing
only one of many perspectives which could be taken of it.
What this brief discussion shows very clearly is

40 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 15. Italics mine.
One is reminded of John Keats' node on a Graecian Urn"
wherein the vase, depicting a moment's activity as frozen
and eternally changeless, becomes the prototype of the
visual arts.
41 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 32.
Cf. p. 22.
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the definite effect which the analytical method has, not
only upon language, but upon the expressive forms of music
and art.

If intellectual analysis consists in the tendency

to innnobilize and divide the continuous flow of duration
into discrete perceptions and concepts, then it is equally
important to recognize that our most connnon forms of expression are infected with the same tendencies.
amining the

intu~tive

Upon ex-

method, which is capable of grasping

duration as duration, these three expressive forms will be
reviewed again in terms of the possibilities they hold for
overcoming the limitations imposed by intellectual analysis.
Intuition:

An Alternative to the Intellect

Bergson's study of the problems of the intellect,
particularly its inability to conceive duration, leads not
only to a critique of the analytical method, but to the
constructive suggestion that the mind adopt an alternative
mode of knowing, intuition.

The methodological differences

between the intellect and intuition arise from their fundamental difference in purpose:

whereas the intellect is

governed by practical interests and approaches objects with
a view towards their utilization, intuition seeks only a
pure, disinterested knowledge of reality as it is;

while

the aim of the intellect is to seek in reality a support
for action, intuition seeks to comprehend reality in its
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d'iacy. 42
.
concrete imme

In order to accomplish its objective, intuition
must avoid the pitfalls of intellectual analysis.

Since the

intellect's tendency to assume a point of view in perception
and employ conceptual representations in the thought process
serves to generalize and immobilize the concrete duration of
existing things, intuition must either dispense with the
tools and operations of the intellect or substantially revise them in order to grasp duration as duration.

Thus, as

Bergson develops the theory of intuition, he contrasts it
point by point with the method of intellectual analysis. 43

42 introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 38-39; Creative
Evolution, pp. 324-25, 372-73; Creative Mind, pp. 34, 127,
138; Two Sources, pp. 249-50. It is instructive here to
note that intuition has its roots in instinct. Although
"instinct is not within the domain of intelligence," it
is capable of an immediate "knowledge" of definite objects
without the tendency to solidify them or view them as inert
bits of matter. (Creative Evolution, p. 163 f.) Unlike intelligence, "instinct is molded on the very form of life."
(Creative Evolution, p. 182) Intuition is instinct elevated
to the level of rexlection.
(Creative Evolution, p. 194;
Creative Mind, p. 88) Although intuition abandons the practical interests of instinct, it retains its ability to grasp
objects in their particularity and vitality.
(Creativt
Evolution, p. 194; Two Sources, pp. 249-50) For a more
extended discussion of instinct, see J. M'Keller Stewart,
A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1911); 17 -82.

43 see Andre Robinet, Bergson et les metamorphoses
de la dur€e (Paris: Seghers, 19 5), pp. 144-48. There are
at least two problems which result from the fact that
Bergson contrasts the intuitive method with that of the
intellect. First, Bergson's theory of intuition is frequently criticized as anti-intellectual. This is clearly
not the case since, as noted early in this chapter, intuition
is actually a function of the intellect. In an article
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Intuition begins in perception with the abandonment
of the perspective or point of view adopted in analysis.
Instead of assuming a position outside the object, Bergson
proposes that the mind "enter into the object. 1144 to perceive it "from where it is, from within, as it is in itself .1145

This penetration of the object is accomplished by

a kind of "intellectual ausculation" or "intellectual
sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in
order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently
inexpressible. ,,4 6 Relinquishing its practical interests,

entitled "Bergson's Reflective Anti-Intellectualism," The·
Personalist, XLVII (1966), 43-60, Pete Gunter argues that,
although Bergson is critical of the intellect, he is not,
in any extreme sense, anti-intellectual. Intuition, after
all, is a type of reflection which is able to grasp reality
more firmly and more completely than the intellect can.
(See Chapter II, n. 49.) Second, Bergson is frequently
criticized for defining intuition only negatively. As our
subsequent discussion will show, intuition includes a theory
of perception, conception and expression which are not
simply negations of the intellectual method. but which
have a positive content of their own.
44 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 23,
24, 51; Creative Evolution, pp. 194-95.
45 Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22. Although
Theau's discussion of intuition lacks focus, it contains
several lucid descriptions of this and subsequent stages of
the intuitive process (La critique bergsonienne du concept,
pp. 135-47).
46 Ibid., pp. 23-24. Cf. pp. 36-37, 51, 61. H. Waldon Carr argues that intuition is non-intellectual on the
grounds that it is neither a perception nor conception. As
our discussion will show, this interpretation is wholly untenable since Bergson does make positive recommendations
for the intuitive method at both stages. (Henri Bergson,
The Philoso}hy of Change, Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat
Press, 1970 , p. 22.
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the mind becomes attentive and sympathetic to what the
object is in itself. 47 Instead of multiplying perspectives, dividing and isolating its different positions or
moments or properties, the mind perceives the simple, indivisible reality of the particular object which underlies ·
all of these descriptions. 48 Since the mind possesses its
object completely, there is nothing to be gained by subjecting it to analysis.

"Coincidence" with the object

clearly obviates the need to measure and calculate its
spatio-temporal movements from the outside.

Rather, con-

sciousness adapts its own rhythm to that of the object and
enters into its temporal flow. 49 Thus the concreteness and
endurance of the object are already established in perception.

47 Merleau-Ponty rightly suggests that for Bergson
"sympathy" does not mean that consciousness "becomes the
organism" but rather that it "takes the thing by knowledge."
Jean DePrun, ed., L'union de l'ame et du corps chez Malebranche, Brian et Berfson. Notes prises au cours de M.
Merleau-Ponty a l'~co e normale superieure (1947-48).
(Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968), p. 114.
48 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 28-29,
40-41, 51, 60; Creative Mind, pp. 30-31. Bergson denotes
the essence of the object by the unfortunate term "absolute"
by which he means the object itself, the original. Although
Bergson recognizes that the absolute can be analysed and
divided indefinitely, he argues that "viewed from the inside,
it is a simple thing." (Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 23)
49 At the same time that Bergson collapses the distance between consciousness and its object in perception,
he claims with equal insistence that intuition is a type of
reflection.
(Creative Mind, p. 88) Is there not a contradiction here? On the one hand, reflection seems to demand
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In order to avoid a regression to abstractness and
immobility on the level of conception, Bergson boldly suggests that the mind dispense with conceptual representations
employed by the intellect in analysis. 50 Although Bergson
occasionally hints that concepts can serve to prepare the
mind for seizing its intuitions, 51 he argues much more
extensively and forcibly that concepts serve more to prevent
than to facilitate intuitive apprehensions. 52 In arguments
set out in the previous section, the concept draws criticism for its twofold tendency to an abstractness which obscures the particularity of the concrete object, and to an
immobility which stabilizes its interrupted flow.

Although

there are several texts which explicitly state that thought

that consciousness objectify what it seeks to know, that is,
that it create a distance between itself and its object. On
the other hand, Bergson suggests that intuition is a kind of
reflection which relies upon the "coincidence" between
knower and known.
(Creative Mind, p. 32) Seemingly unaware
of the implications of reflection, Bergson fails to confront
the problem and, as a consequence, also fails to resolve it.
In situating Bergson within the context of phenomenology,
VanPeursen introduces the issue but lends it only brief
discussion. C. A. VanPeursen, "Henri Bergson, phenomenologie de la perception," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale,
LXV (1960), p. 323.
SOBergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 22,

24. 56.
51 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 164; Creative
Evolution, pp. 42-43; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 61;
Creative Mind, pp. 42, 120.
52 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 30, 37.
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could occur in the absence of conceptual symbols 53 ~a dramatic statement which is never justified or

explained~there

are other, more sober texts which reconnnend that the concepts of intellectual analysis be replaced by "new concepts,"
which are "supple, mobile, almost fluid representations always ready to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition. 1154
Regretably, this notion of the "fluid concept,"
which is the mainstay of the intuitive method, is never explicitly illustrated nor defined.

Its interpretation is

unquestionably crucial to the theory of intuition, since the
concept is integral to the processes of thought and expression.

Our approach in deciphering this most obscure sugges-

tion will be, first of all, to examine Bergson's occasional
references to "fluid concepts" in an effort to delineate
their essential features, and then in the following chapter
to analyze our conventional expressive forms to determine
the extent to which the new concept can be articulated in
language, music and art.

Thus, once the basic character-

istics of the fluid concept are defined, it then will be
possible to specify what forms of expression, if any, are
appropriate to them.

53 see Chapter II, n. 50.

54 Bergson, Intro duction
.
.
p. 30.
to Meta8 h ysics,

pp. 37, 51; Creative Evolution, p. 55;
29, 31, 44-45; Two Sources, p. 254.

Cf.
reative Mind, pp.

r
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The guidelines which Bergson establishes for the
"fluid concept" are, quite predictably, designed to overcome the problems of the ordinary concept employed in analysis.

Consequently, the new concept must "be cut to the
exact measure of the object, 1155 it must be "a concept which
is appropriate to that object alone, a concept which can

yet hardly be called a concept, since it applies to this
one thing. 1156 In other words, the concept must be tailored
to the individual object, and must sacrifice the generality
which ordinarily makes it applicable to a number of similar
things. 57 Furthermore, the new concept must be fluid, that
is, "capable of following reality in all its sinuousities
and of adopting the very movement of the inward life of
things. 1158 Clearly, if the new concept is to facilitate
our intuitive grasp of the enduring world, it must abandon
both the generality and the rigidity which, in analysis, are
so essential to it.
Although Bergson very plainly sets out these characteristics of the new concept, he never explains how the ordinary concept should be altered to fit them.

The only thing

55 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 29.
56 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 37.
57 cf. Chapter II, pp. 41-43. By contrast, the
concept employed in analysis sacrifices the particular for
the sake of the general.
58 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 51.
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about which Bergson is definite is that the "fluid concept"
is necessary to intuition.

Underlying his faith in the

fluid concept, and the intuitive method which it serves, is
his tacit assumption that the mind can "reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks" and is
able "perpetually to revise, or rather to recast,all its
categories. 1159 Not only must the mind change its fundamental orientation to the world by forsaking its practical
interests in favor of a pure, disinterested knowledge of the
real, but it must revise its usual mode of perception by
giving up its external point of view for coincidence with
the object, it must replace the static concepts by which it
ordinarily thinks with new, fluid concepts, and finally it
must devise forms of expression which are appropriate to
the demands of the new concept.

Although Bergson frequently
remarks upon the difficulty of this procedure, 60 he argues
that the structure of the mind is not invariable, and whatever the mind can do it can also undo. 61 Despite the habitual tendencies of the mind to conform to the analytical

59 Bergson consistently speaks of intuition, not as
an automatic "flash" understanding, but as a process of
thought requiring effort.
(Introduction to Metaphysics,
pp. 47, 60; Creative Mind, p. 35)
60Bergson, Introduction to Metaph~sics, p. 51. Cf.
pp. 38, 45, 52; Matter and Memory, pp. 24 -41; Creative
Evolution, pp. 35, 178, 339, 341; Creative Mind, pp. 61,

70, 142.

61 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 28-29, 70-73, 128.

60
method, Bergson maintains that this does not preclude the
possibility of one's thinking intuitively and obtaining a
direct, immediate grasp of the concrete duration of things.
Bergson's epistemological theory of intuition is
indefensible philosophically unless the notion of "fluid
concept" can be concretely illustrated and shown to be
viable.

Hanging in the balance is not only the justifica-

tion of the intuitive method, but the validity of the metaphysical claims which depend upon it.

Bergson's arguments

on behalf of the duration of consciousness and the external
world presuppose the mind's ability to work intuitively,
that is, to rid itself of those cognitive elements which
divest duration of its concreteness and its continuous movement.

In turn, the mind's ability to apprehend duration as

duration shows that it is able to transcend the spatial categories of the intellect and employ the simple, direct method
of intuition.

The implicit circularity of Bergson's posi-

tion can only be broken by determining the tenability of the
intuitive

method~an

argument which depends upon giving some

specific sense to the theory of the "fluid concept."

CHAPTER III
FLUID FORMS OF EXPRESSION:
LANGUAGE, MUSIC AND ART
The preceding analysis of Bergson's metaphysics and
epistemology enables us now to formulate the problem of expression in more precise terms.

As Bergson establishes a

metaphysics of duration, he begins to question how an essentially temporal world, which is continuously moving and
changing, can be known.

His epistemological distinction

between intellectual analysis and intuition provides alternative responses to this question.

On the one hand, the

method of intellectual analysis fails to grasp duration as
duration because of its predominantly practical interest,
which requires that it abstract and stabilize the random
particulars of experience to gain a foothold for action.
Intuition, on the other hand, with no practical interest,
seeks neither to abstract what is concrete nor to arrest
what is fluid; it thereby achieves an immediate grasp of
duree which is beyond the reach of analysis.

Although

Bergson's theory of intuition assures us that knowledge of
the enduring world is possible, the question remains as to
how these intuitive apprehensions are conceived and expressed.
61
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Critics of Bergson often find that the method of
intuition is simple-so simple in fact that it cannot be
called a method at all.

Intuition, they claim, is nothing

more than "a flash understanding," an instantaneous, prereflective insight which it is impossible to symbolize or
express. 1 This reading of Bergson is grossly incomplete.
As I have argued in Chapter II, intuition is a cognitive
process with recognizable stages which (Bergson all too
vaguely suggests) does not dispense with symbols, but adopts
a curious variety of them.

When Bergson recommends that the

mind employ "fluid concepts," he does not forsake conceptual
symbols but encourages a radical rethinking of them; he does
not deny the possibility of expressing one's intuition, but
demands a reinterpretation of conventional expressive forms.
This notion of the fluid concept, albeit obliquely stated
in Bergson's texts, contains the germ of a new theory of
human thought and expression.
Bergson so long belabored the problems of the conventional concept employed in analysis, that he gave little
attention to delineating the new concept appropriate to
intuition.

One positive effect of this disproportionate

1 It is especially alarming that Susanne K. Langer,
who is usually such an intelligent and perceptive reader of
Bergson, subscribes to this view. Feeling and Form (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 375. Philosoph~ in
a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 73),
p. 98. See also Jacques Maritain, Bergsonian Philosolh~ and
Thomism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 6 .
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interest was that, as he more clearly discerned the deficiencies of the ordinary concept, he became better able to
establish the guidelines for what the new concept should be.
Accordingly Bergson defines the new concept in terms of two
characteristics:

its ability to grasp the particularity

and concreteness of an object; and its ability to become
fluid, molding itself to the mobile duration of existing
things.

Unfortunately, these two criteria receive no spe-

cific illustration by Bergson.

In a few scattered and

fragmentary passages, Bergson does hint that language, music
and the visual arts may be adapted to the requirements of
the "fluid concept."

The nature of this adaption, however,

is never explained.
These enigmatic texts hold the key to Bergson's
theory of the "new concept."

If one can determine the

linguistic, musical and artistic forms which accormnodate the
fluid concept and meet its requirements, then one will, in
effect, disclose the logical form by which particularity and
fluidity are conceived in intuition.

By examining these

three expressive forms, I hope to show that the notion of
the "fluid concept" has a viable and intelligible philosophic meaning, and that, as a result, the intuitive process
to which it is integral can be divested of its mystery and
obscurity, and Bergson's rather innovative philosophy of
expression can be seen in a clearer light.
Any attempt to decipher the "fluid concept" must

______

......
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necessarily be venturesome.

Bergson's treatment of this

notion is so abstruse and incomplete that any coherent
interpretation of it must reach beyond his texts.

The sub-

sequent discussion, therefore, will draw from certain aestheticians and philosophers of language whose theories of
language, music and art seem consistent with Bergson's
position, and yet capable of extending its basic meaning.
These supplementary theories will lend Bergson the vocabulary and models for delineating the "fluid concept" which
his own philosophy so sorely lacks.
Language
When Bergson critizes language for its static and
general character, he is referring to what linguists and
aestheticians call the discursiveness of language.

Susanne

K. Langer offers a classic description of discursiveness in
her early work Philosophy in a New Key (1942):
Language in the strict sense is essentially discursive;
it has permanent units of meaning which are combinable
into larger units; it has fixed equivalences that make
definition and translation possible; its connotations
are general, so that it requires non-verbal acts, like
pointing, looking, or emphatic voice-inflections, to
assign specific denotations to its terms.2
Bergson's entire critique of conceptual thought and its
linguistic symbolism focuses precisely on these two features
of ordinary semantics, namely, that the word is a "permanent

2

Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 96-97.
Italics mine.
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unit of meaning" which, once defined, is relatively invariable; and further, that the word exhibits generality in so
far as its meaning is broad enough to encompass numerous
particular things. 3 The stability characteristic of word
meanings is also evident in the form of words and the syntactical structure of propositions.

Langer's description

of the formal properties of discursive language exactly fits
Bergson's model of a linear, spatial symbolism:
words have a linear, discrete, successive order; they
are strung together one after another like beads on a
rosary; beyond the very limited meanings of inflections
which can be incorporated in the words themselves, we
cannot talk in simultaneous bunches of names. We must
name one thing and then another . . . all language has
a form which requires us to string out our ideas even
though their objects rest one within the other . . . .
This property of verbal symbolism is known as discursiveness; by reason of it, only thoughts which can be
arranged in this particular order can be spoken at
all . . . 4
The demarcation and isolation of words within definite

3 Bergson's criticism of discursive language bears
principally upon its referential uses, its naming or denoting of things. Since Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (1945-49) first challenged the
theory that the principal function of language is naming,
philosophers have recognized that its uses are far broader
than simple reference. John Austin, for example, discusses
"performative" language, such as promising, rebuking, betting, vowing, pardoning, thanking, predicting and apologizing, in which the words are performing an act rather
than referring to the performance itself. Such analysis
points to the fact that language has multiple uses, only
one of which is that of denoting and naming. Bergson's
insensitivity to these distinctions is explained by the
fact that his own work predates these discoveries.
4 Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 80-81.
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boundaries betray the essentially static character of discursive linguistic forms.

When the mind, operating accord-

ing to its cinematographical habits, strings together these
discrete units in propositions, there results only a linear
succession of immobilities, external and in juxtaposition
to one another.

In short, discursive language is a type of

expression which, being relatively invariable in form and
meaning, renders static whatever is fluid and mobile, and
being general in its signification, never exactly expresses
the particular features of individual objects.

As Bergson

criticizes language for failing to deliver fully the enduring world one grasps immediately in intuition, he is
criticizing the fundamental discursiveness of ordinary
language.
When Bergson recommends that intuition abandon the
ordinary concepts of analysis and create new fluid concepts,
what he is suggesting, in terms of language, is that one
replace discursive with non-discursive linguistic forms.
Since Bergson's criticism of discursive language bears upon
both the meaning and form of words, upon both semantics and
syntax, it is necessary to explore non-discursive uses of
language which pertain to word meanings, as well as to
those involving structural or syntactical modifications.
This twofold reassessment of language will show that its
non-discursive expressive forms fulfill the requirements
of Bergson's "fluid concept," thereby giving that elusive

-

--------- ---
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notion some specific sense.
The classic move away from the permanence and generality of discursive word meanings is the metaphor.

Each

of the three major theories of metaphor I will review here
explains at least in part how language can, on the level of
meaning, achieve the concreteness and fluidity which Bergson
recommends to the new concept. 5 At times these theories
simply will serve to give a sharper articulation to a vague
suggestion Bergson has made; at other times, they will disclose possibilities which Bergson himself did not envision,
but which remain consistent with his basic view.

The three

theories under consideration are:
1.

The Comparison View of metaphor, a designation

given by Max Black to describe the theory inherited from
Aristotle.

I will draw from the language studies of Max

5My designation of three theories of metaphor is
slightly at variance with the four types of metaphor set
out by Monroe C. Beardsley in ~article "Metaphor,"
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed. The discrepancy is due
not to a disagreement on the fundamental issues so much as
a different organization of them and different designations
for them. While both of us treat the "Comparison View" by
that name, my use of Black's "Interaction Theory" includes
issues which Beardsley deals with separately under the
"Iconic-Signification Theory" and the "Verbal Opposition
Theory." I neglect to analyze explicitly the "Emotive
Theory" to which Beardsley refers. Its exclusion is due
to the serious problems with the theory which Beardsley
outlines in his article. My addition of Wheelwright's
"Diaphoric View" is grounded in the fact that it has important implications for Bergson's philosophy. In his
"Verbal Opposition Theory" Beardsley recognizes the dynamics
of diaphor, but fails to define fully its distinctive work.
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Black, Susanne Langer and Philip Wheelwright to explain the
essential features of the comparison view.

While Bergson

explicitly acknowledges that this metaphoric use of language
achieves a

certainconcr~teness

in grasping its objects, he

is critical of the inherent generality from which it never
entirely escapes.
2.

The second theory, which involves a reinterpre-

tation of the first, holds more promise.

Once again,

Black's descriptive title, the Interaction View, is most
apt.

Both Black and Wheelwright suggest that a close look

at the workings of the conventional metaphor will show that
a vital tension between the metaphoric word and its object
circumvents the problem of generality and, in addition,
accounts for a semantic fluidity unattainable in the simpler
comparison view.
3.

Third is a theory for which there is, as yet, no

convenient label.
suffice.

Wheelwright's term Diaphor will have to

Both Wheelwright and Langer analyze the effect of

accumulating diverse images to describe a single object,
person or event.

Bergson alludes to this view, and, al-

though he recognizes its strength, he does not see its full
import for the theory of the fluid concept.
Comparison View
The Comparison View of metaphor is first enunciated
in Aristotle's Poetics:

"Metaphor consists in giving the

thing a name that belongs to something else."

(1947b)

This
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terse explanation survives in contemporary theories of
language where it is amplified and given more definite description.

In Philosophy in a New Key, Susanne Langer ex-

plains metaphor as the use of one word, for which there is
a precise literal meaning, to denote another kind of object
or event in a non-literal or figurative sense.

Metaphor

consists in taking a word or phrase whose meaning is comprehensible and transferring it to something which "has no
name of its own. 116 Philip Wheelwright describes the same
metaphorical use of language, but broadens it to include
reference to little known, as well as unknown, aspects of
experience.

For this type of metaphor, he prefers the more

exact term epiphor.
Epiphoric metaphor starts by assuming a usual meaning
for a word; it then applies this word to something else
on the basis of, and in order to indicate, a comparison
with what is familiar. The semantic "movement" (p@ora)
here is characteristically from a more concrete an
readily graspable image "over on to" (epi) what is perhaps vaguer, more problematic, or more strange.7

6Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 139-41. In tracing
the life of a metaphor, Langer notes its eventual obsolescence. "Every new experience or new idea about things,
evokes first of all some metaphorical expression. As the
idea becomes familiar, this expression 'fades' to a new,
literal use.'' (p. 141) In the context of Philosophy in a
New Key, Langer adopts her theory of metaphor from Philip
Wegener, Untersuchungen uber die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens, 1885.
7Philip Wheelwright, Meta~hor and Reality, (Bloominton, Ind.: Indiana Universityress, 1962), pp. 72-73.
Cf. James M. Edie, "Expression and Metaphor," Philoso,hical
and Phenomenological Research, XXIII (June, 1963), 54 -48.
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Epiphor occurs in the semantic transference, in the "movement" of the familiar image "over on to" the less well
known object to which it is compared.

For example, when we

say "A mighty fortress is our God," we are comparing the
relatively unknown and ineffable God to a "mighty fortress,"
attempting thereby to convey His strength and majesty.

The

fortress does not give a literal definition of God, but
makes him more intelligible by suggesting his likeness to
a familiar object.
In his book Models and Metaphors from which the
term "comparison view" is taken, Max Black offers an explanation of metaphor which is generally commensurate with
those already cited. 8 There are two additional elaborations
which Black's discussion offers.

First of all, his example

"Richard is a lion" suggests that both terms of the comparison can be familiar, in which case the metaphor is something other than the application of a familiar word to an
unfamiliar object.

The lion-like features of Richard are

8Max Black, Models and Metaphors, (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 35-36. Black finds the
"comparison view" to be a particular form of the broader
"substitution view" of metaphor. The distinction is of
minor importance. In the "substitution view" the metaphoric
word is used in place of a literal designation, since none
is available. There is, in this case simply a substitution
of one word for another. The "comparison view" is only a
more complex form of substitution wherein the likeness
between the metaphoric word and its referent is implied.
Similarly, "the metaphorical statement might be replaced
by an equivalent literal comparison.

""'-
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not necessarily discovered for the first time, as if unknown, but they are merely accentuated when his likeness
to the lion is drawn.

Secondly, Black emphasizes that such

"a metaphor consists in the presentation of the underlying
analogy or similarity" between the subject and the metaphoric word by which it is described.

The characteristics

· which the predicate term denotes and connotes are then
transferred to the subject.

Although this view of metaphor

"as condensed simile or comparison" is quite popular, Black
finds it simplistic in so far as the metaphoric word or
phrase is merely a substitute or proxy for one or more
literal statements by which it could be readily replaced. 9
The metaphoric word is simply a stand-in for a more elaborate literal paraphrase.
In all instances of the comparative

metaphor~wheth-

er it applies to what is unknown, vaguely known or

familiar~

it has at least this advantage, that it gives a vivid concrete sense of the object to which it refers.

Bergson him-

self explicitly recognizes this metaphoric use of language
and finds that, unlike the ordinary concept which is general
and abstract, the metaphor or "image" as he prefers to call

9

Models and Metaphors, pp. 35-36.

L
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it, 10 "keeps us in the concrete. 1111

For example, when Berg-

son describes duration by comparing it to "the unrolling of
a coil," "a myriad-tinted spectrum" or "an elastic body,"
he attempts to provide images of his metaphysical duree
which will make more intelligible and more tangible its
basic features. 12 Rather than relying exclusively on abstract terminology, Bergson draws a comparison with familiar,
accessible objects from everyday life to evoke a sense of
what duration is.
But even to Bergson the limitations of the metaphor
are evident.

In at least one respect, it is prone to the

same deficiency as the ordinary concept.

Since the image,

like the concept, involves comparison it is necessarily
incomplete, expressing some dimensions of its object while
omitting others. 13 Bergson's argument is that comparison
makes manifest a resemblance, "resemblance is a property
of the object, and as a property has every appearance of

10 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 30;
Creative Evolution, p. 348; Creative Mind, pp. 42-43, 80.
Bergson makes a crucial distinction between a "present
image" or object, and a "represented image" or symbol of an
object. Obviously the second meaning is operative here.
11 rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 27, Cf. Creative
Mind, pp. 42-43.
12 Introduction: to Metaphysics, pp. 25-26.

.______________

13 Ibid., p. 27 .
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.
being

t o f t h e o b Ject
.
wh.ic h possesses i. t . 14

~

Any com-

parison requires that an image be distinct from its object,
and yet similar to it; if an image were identical to its
object, or yet if an image did not somehow resemble it,
there would be no basis for comparison.

Consequently an

image discloses those aspects of an object with which it
bears resemblance, but reveals nothing of those aspects
with which it has no affinity.

Thus, Bergson finds that

each of the images he employs to describe duration gives
only a partial view of what duration is.

One image expres-

ses its heterogeneity but sacrifices its continuous movement; the other expresses movement but sacrifices heterogeneity.
If I use the comparison of the spectrum with its thousand shades, I have before me a thing already made,
whilst duration is continually in the making. If I
think of an elastic which is being stretched, or of a
spring which is extended or relaxed, I forget the richness of color, characteristic of duration that is lived,
to see only the simple movement by which consciousness
passes from one shade to another.15
Bergson finds that no single comparison can convey the unity
and multiplicity of an enduring process without neglecting
one aspect or the other.

Since the image is both like and

14 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 27. When Bergson
states that "resemblance is a property of the object," what
he means is that resemblance is a relational property which
the objects possess insofar as they are related through the
metaphoric comparison.
15 Ibid., p. 27.
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unlike the object to which it is compared, it is able to
give a concrete sense only of the particular properties they
share.

Accordingly the comparative metaphor is always in-

complete.
A second criticism of the metaphor is leveled by
Max Black.

It is most damaging to Bergson's cause because

it questions the concreteness he is trying to affirm.
Black states that "The main objection against a comparison
view is that it suffers from a vagueness that borders on
vacuity

. likeness always admits of degrees."

Black

argues that metaphor is incapable of precision; in fact we
. sue h cases wh ere precision
. .
. unattaina
. bl e. 16
use metap h or in
is
The previous comparison between God and "a mighty fortress"
makes the point obvious.

While "a mighty fortress" vividly

suggests certain characteristics of God and brings them
into clearer focus, it does not enumerate them nor give
them explicit description.
evocative.

A metaphor is essentially

It calls forth certain features of its object,

but does not delineate them with scientific exactitude.
What does a metaphoric comparison contribute to
Bergson's 'fluid concept?"

Does it achieve the concrete

and fluid grasp of the objects that Bergson is seeking?
The metaphor clearly moves away from bland abstraction
toward more vital and more concrete imagery, but this move

16 Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 37.
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appears to be limited in what it achieves.

If Bergson's

criticism is accurate, comparison does not deliver its
object entirely, though it does make several of its traits
more recognizable and more immediate.

Black's criticism

raises more serious problems since it attacks the claim to
concreteness which Bergson presumes.

Black seems to be

correct in suggesting that the metaphor is a poor literal
substitute~that

it is attended with a certain semantic

ambiguity that makes it inexact and elusive.

This is, to

Black's mind, precisely the problem in viewing metaphor as
a proxy for literal meaning.

One is in effect asking the

metaphor to be something it is not intended to be.

What is

at stake is not the concreteness of the metaphoric image
at all, but its inability to be reduced to an exact literal
equivalent.

The comparison view makes the fatal mistake of

assuming that a literal translation of the metaphor is possible, even desirable.

The two subsequent theories of

metaphor will show that it is not.

By developing a more

sophisticated, incisive view of the workings of metaphor,
the criticisms made by both Bergson and Black are, to a
large extent, circumvented

by more adequate linguistic

formulations for the "fluid concept."
Interaction View
The Interaction View of metaphor is a designation
once again borrowed from Max Black, who, in turn, credits
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I. A. Richards with the fundamentals of the theory. 17

Its

basic tenet is that an expression like "Man is a wolf"
works metaphorically due to a semantic interaction between
the two terms.

Black claims that attached to the word

"wolf" is what he calls a system of associated commonplaces,
which includes everything held to be true about wolves
which would immediately come to one's mind upon hearing
the word. 18 While having this store of associations presumes some familiarity with the concept "wolf," it does
not require a knowledge of the standard dictionary meaning
nor a firm sense of its literal denotative uses.

As Black

explains, "the system of commonplaces may include halftruths or downright mistakes . . . but the important thing
for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and
freely evoked. 1119

The metaphorical expression "Man is a

wolf," calls up "the wolf-system of related commonplaces"
and extends them to the principal subject, man.

17 See Max Black, Models and Metaphors, pp. 38-44.
Cf. I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 89-138.
18Models and Metaphors, p. 40.
19 Ibid., p. 40.

Black does allow that a novelist or
poet can "establish a novel pattern of implications for the
literal uses of the key expressions prior to using them as
vehicles for his metaphors." In other words, "Metaphors can
be supported by specially constructed systems of implications, as well as by accepted commonplaces." (p. 43)
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A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of
implications to construct a corresponding system of
implications about the principal subject. But these
implications will not be those comprised in the commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of "man."
. . . Any human traits that can without undue strain
be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered
prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into
the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some
details, emphasizes others~in short, organizes our
view of man. 20
Black sees the metaphoric word as a kind of filter through
which the principal subject is seen.

What occurs is a

transformation of the literal meanings of both terms:

the

subject, man, is not given a literal definition, but is
characterized by the rich, though startling implications
of the predicate "wolf;" the term "wolf" accordingly is
applied in a non-literal sense, exploring the wide range
of associations which hover over the word.

The result is

a semantic blend, a new "system" of meaning, which is irre21
ducible to a literal translation of either term.

20Models and Metaphors, p. 41.
21 see Models and Metaphors, p. 46. "Suppose we try
to state the cognitive content of an interaction-metaphor
in 'plain language.,. Up to a point, we may succeed in
stating a number of relevant relations between the two subjects . . . . But the set of literal statements so obtained
will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the
original. For one thing, the implications, previously left
for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a nice
feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented explicitly as though having equal
weight. The literal paraphrase inevitably says too much~
and with the wrong emphasis. One of the points I most wish
to stress is that the loss in such cases is a loss in cognitive content; the relevant weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or boringly
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A similar theory of semantic interaction is devel22
oped by Philip Wheelwright.
He maintains that words overcome the rigidity of their discursive meanings by plurisignation, which occurs when
more than one meaning is suggested simultaneously by a
certain word or phrase or image. Or, more characteristically, there may be a group of verbal symbols. put
together in a certain syntax and suggesting certain
images, some more overtly than others, with the result
that the intertllay of meaninys and half-meanings is far
more co ious t an an litera
ara hrase could ever
Wheelwright joins Black in recognizing in language the same
semantic possibilities:

that a single image or set of

images can exploit the multiple meanings which attend them,
and, when used effectively. can create a vast "interplay"
of associations.

Plurisignation involves precisely this

mobilization and blend of meanings. which always exceeds

explicit (or deficient in qualities of style); it fails to
give the insight that the metaphor did."
This untranslatability of metaphor has given rise to
what philosophers call the Double-Language thesis, which
holds that there are two different forms of language, the
literal and the metaphorical, each of which is irreducible
to the other. Monroe Beardsley is correct in finding the
Double-Language thesis operative in Bergson's philosophy.
As he states, "there is a language of mechanism and a whole
distinct language of the elan vital;" the former is clearly
the more literal discursive language, the latter the language of metaphor.
(Beardsley, "Metaphor.")
22 The theory is first introduced by Wheelwright's
Metaphor and Reality, pp. 57-65, and is more fully developed in his later work The Burning Fountain (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1968). pp. 115-19.
23Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 57.
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what the word or phrase literally says. 24
The interaction view of metaphor has this advantage,
that it accounts for a semantic fluidity, an interplay of
word meanings, which is infinitely more complex and effective than the simple substitution of one word for another
proposed in the comparison view.

The interaction view

acknowledges that words are a constellation of denotations,
connotations and commonplace associations.

A metaphoric

comparison evokes these multiple meanings of the terms
compared and incites their interplay.

What results is a

new metaphorical meaning with a unique emotional texture
which is irreducible to the sum of the meanings of the respective terms.

The success of the metaphor conceived as a

dynamic interaction is hard to predict, principally because
it rests on subjective factors.

To one who is semi-literate

or vaguely familiar with the language, or to one whose range
of experience is limited, a metaphorical expression may

24 Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 242. Langer,
borrowing the vocabulary of Freud, speaks of over-determination of words, meaning thereby that the same word can
have more than one import. An interesting addition to the
theories of Black and Wheelwright is the "ambivalence" of
words, their power to express at once two contradictory
affects. As Langer states, "I believe the power of artistic
forms to be emotionally ambivalent springs from the fact
that emotional opposites--joy and grief, desire and fear,
and so forth--are of ten very similar in their dynamic
structure, and reminiscent of each other. Small shifts of
expression can bring them together, and show their intimate
relations to each other, whereas literal description can
only emphasize their separateness."
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border on total meaninglessness; on the other hand, to
another who knows the language well and whose long experience has built up a strong store of "commonplace associations," the simplest metaphorical phrase can be highly
suggestive and rich in meaning.

One's ability to exploit

the full sense of the metaphoric comparison to a large extent determines the depth of meaning it finally delivers.
But how concrete and complete a grasp of an object
does this semantic fluidity allow?

There is little doubt

that calling a man a wolf is more concrete and vivid than
saying, more prosaically, that he is dangerous and quick
to anger.

The term "wolf," charged with emotional over-

tones and a wealth of associations, gives certain of the
man's characteristics an immediacy and presence which less
figurative language is not empowered to do.

Considerably

more problematic, however, is the question of how complete
a grasp of an object one gains by any metaphorical expression.

As Bergson recognizes, a comparison exaggerates

some features of its object, while others recede and go
unnoticed.

This partiality can only be remedied by a third

type of metaphor which collects several images around a
particular object, evoking its full particularity by a
fusion of traits borrowed from these numerous comparisons.
Diaphoric View
In order to identify this third type of metaphor,
I borrow Philip Wheelwright's term diaphor.

Wheelwright
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explains that in diaphor "the 'movement' (phora) is
'through' (dia) certain particulars of experience (actual
or imagined) in a fresh way, producing new meaning by juxtaposition alone. 1125 This is the familiar technique of
the novelist and poet who gather numerous diverse images
which converge to evoke a particular person, feeling or
place.

Susanne Langer offers the most lucid analysis of

how diaphor actually works.

Her example is a Chinese poem

"A Farewell in the Evening Rain."
Is it raining on the river all the way to Ch'u?-The evening bell comes to us from Nan-king.
Your wet sail drags and is loath to be going
And shadowy birds are flying slow.
We cannot see the deep ocean-gate-Only the boughs of Pu-kou, newly dripping.
Likewise, because of our great love,
There are threads of water on our faces. 26
Langer finds that all imagery in the poem works together
to create a single virtual event, a semblance of the actual
experience of lovers departing.

The poet is not merely

describing a setting, he is building image upon
each tinged with weightiness and

sadness~which

image~

all to-

gether evoke the deep emotion which attends "farewell."
As Langer explains,
The rain on the river, in the sails, on the obstructing

25Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 78. Cf.
p. 72 where Wheelwright more accurately explains the work
of diaphor as involving not only the juxtaposition of
images but also their synthesis.
26 Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 215 .

...
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boughs, finally becomes a flow of tears. It is
brought in through the poem, in approximately every
other line, so that the further items~the bell, the
shadowy birds, the invisible ocean-gate~merge with
it, and are consequently gathered up with it into the
great love for which the whole poem is weeping. Furthermore, those apparently casual local events interspersed between the rain-lines are all symbols of the
bond that makes parting painful. Nan-king is calling;
the sail is heavy, sailing is hard; the birds, which
are going away, are slow, and they are shadowy~The
shadow; the "deep ocean-gate," the greater place that
is Li Ts'ao's next destination, is not to be seen for
the near precious place, "the boughs of Pu-kou," obstructing all interest in the venture. And so the
apparently simple description builds up to the confession of human feeling . . . 27
Langer's explication clearly shows how the poem's diverse
images combine to create the feeling of sorrow.
does the poet explicitly refer to the
literal description of it.

At no time

emotion~there

is no

Rather, its several images

work together metaphorically to evoke the feeling itself.
In Wheelwright's terminology, the sadness of the farewell
is the "presiding image," or perhaps better, the "presiding
theme" which creates the diaphoric synthesis. 28 The unity
of the poem is intrinsic to the imagery itself.

Each image

within the poem, in its distinctive way, points to the same

27 Feeling and Form, pp. 215-16.
28 Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 83. Langer
adds that even in poems like T. S. Eliot's "The Love Song
of J. Alfred Prufrock" where the imagery is disjointed, the
reader should be able to find its convergence in a definite
type of "presented 'world."' If this focus is unattainable,
Langer suggests that there is either something wrong with
the poem or with the reader's literary comprehension.
(Feeling and Form, p. 217) -
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presiding emotion.

Taken together, they form one coherent

metaphorical expression for the experience and feeling of
farewell. 29
With much less attention to how the diaphoric synthesis occurs, Bergson himself finds the use of diaphor
advantageous.

Having recognized the inadequacy of em-

ploying any one image to deliver fully the notion of pure
duration, Bergson goes on to suggest that numerous, diverse
images together may facilitate a more complete grasp of
pure duration.

As he states in Introduction to Metaphysics,

No image can replace the intuition of duration, but
many diverse images borrowed from very different orders
of things may, by the convergence of their action,
direct consciousness to the precise point where there
is a certain intuition to be seized.30
The technique of the novelist and poet is similar.

Bergson

finds that they expand upon a single feeling or idea by
creating numerous images which, in turn, combine to evoke
the essential simplicity of the original intuition. 31 What

29Wheelwright compares the workings of the diaphoric
image to the combining of elements in nature. In some prehistoric time, when hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms combined
to produce water, a new substance came into existence through
the synthesis of disparate elements; so too in literature,
new constellations of previously unjoined images create new
suggestions of meaning.
(Metaphor and Reality, pp. 83-85)
30 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 27-28.
31 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 15, 164; Introduction to MetaphysICS, p. 22; Creative Evolution, pp. 228,

348.
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Bergson is alluding to in these texts is the diaphoric
theory of metaphor, the precise workings of which he never
explains.

The more incisive analysis of Wheelwright and

Langer discussed above, accounting as they do for the unity
of the diaphoric imagery, are necessary to substantiate and
complete Bergson's vague suggestion.
What then does the diaphor contribute to Bergson's
theory of the "new concept?"

First of all, there is im-

plicit in the diaphoric process a certain semantic fluidity,
insofar as the meaning which finally emerges permeates, or
"flows through," the multiple images which are collected
to evoke it.

That is one reason why there is often no

single correct interpretation of a novel or poem.

Its

meaning is read off the several images the artist presents;
when an interpreter emphasizes one image or set of images
over another, or probes their import from a different perspective, there often are subtle shifts in the overall
meaning.

While the imagery in a unified poem obviously

does not allow for just any random interpretation, it does
provide for a latitude of possible interpretations within
the limits of what the imagery can express.
The concreteness which Bergson requires of the
"fluid concept" is evident here as it was in the comparison
and interaction views.

Whether one compares a man to a

wolf or describes sorrow in terms of "shadowy birds flying
slow" and "threads of water on our faces," one in either

85

case avoids the generality of more literal statements and
creates instead a more vivid, tangible and immediate sense
of the object expressed.

Furthermore, Bergson intimates

that when multiple images converge on a single reality,
that reality is not only expressed more concretely, but
also more completely.

His instinct seems correct.

If each

of the several images accentuates certain characteristics
of an object, the aspects it neglects can be emphasized by
another, and so on indefinitely.

The collective effect is

a relatively complete grasp of the object. far exceeding
that attained in either of the other uses of metaphor.
A final consideration in our study of the adaptability of language to the "fluid concept" is the prospect
of a structural modification of language itself.

When

Bergson demands of the intuitive mind that it recast all
its categories, do violence to itself and to language, 32
he urges a radical restructuring of conventional discourse
in which inert, individual words, with well-defined boundaries and meanings, stand side by side in predictable logical sequence.

While there are those who argue that the

form of words need not be adapted to their meaning, that
words need not be harsh to express harshness or be wet to

32 See n. 59, Chapter II, especially Introduction to
Metaphysics, p. 51; Creative Evolution, p. 35; Creative
Mind, p. 61; Two Sources, p. 254.
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express wetness, 33 their criticism seems to be directed
toward a simple imitative technique like onomatopoeia
rather than toward the more elaborate experimentation with
linguistic form which has been undertaken successfully in
contemporary literature.

The latter will be especially

significant for Bergson's theory by showing that liberation
from rigid discursive· forms can result in a liberation from
the confines of static denotative meanings as well; the
combined effect will be a linguistic fluidity and concreteness appropriate to the "new concept."
Bergson's explicit recommendation regarding the
structural re-formation of language is cautious.

Its focus

is primarily upon the rhythm and flow of the sentence which,
he suggests, determines its effectiveness in conveying a
meaning.
The words may then have been well chosen, they will not
convey the whole of what we wish to make them say if we
do not succeed by the rhythm, by the punctuation, by
the relative lengths of the sentences and parts of the
sentences, by a particular dancing of the sentence, in
making the reader's mind, continually guided by a series
of nascent movements, describe a curve of thought and

33 r was first struck by this point while attending
a lecture by Arthur Danto entitled "Language, God and Reality in Nietzsche's Philosophy" (Nietzsche Conference,
DePaul University, Chicago, November 24, 1972). Danto made
explicit reference to Bergson's naivete in assuming this
direct correlation between word structure and word meaning.
See also Susanne Langer, Philoso}hy in a New Key, p. 81;
George Boas, "Bergson (1859-1941 and His Predecessors,"
Journal of the History of Ideas, XX (1959), 505.
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feeling analogous to that we ourselves describe. 34
Susanne Langer, extending Bergson's basic insight, speaks
of more radical structural changes which she describes as
condensation of symbols:

"it is essentially a fusion of

forms themselves by intersection, contraction, elision,
35 Langer proposes an
.
.
suppression
an d many ot h er d evices.
interplay and fusion of word forms in a variety of ways,
which involve not only slight syntactical modifications,
but a fundamental breakdown of the word structures themselves.
The classic example of such an experiment with
language is James Joyce's Finnegans Wake.

In Part I,

Joyce describes Finnegan:
Of the first was he to bear arms and a name:
Wassaily Booselaeugh of Riesengeborg. His crest
of huroldry, in vert with ancillars, troubland,
argent,a hegoak,poursuivant,horrid,horned. His
scutschum fessed, with archers strung, helio, of
the second. Hootch is for husbandman handling his
how. Hohohoho, Mister Finn, you're going to be
Mister Finnagainl Comeday morn and, O,you're vine!

34Bergson, Mind Energy, pp. 56-57. Archibald MacLeish makes the same point more clearly in Poetry and
Exgerience (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1960 , p. 23.
"Te poem's meaning is evoked by the structure of wordsas-sounds rather than by the structure of words-as-meanings.
And the enhancement of meaning, which we feel in any true
poem, is a product, therefore, of the structure of sounds."
.
. 35 Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 244. Cf. Philosothy
in a New Key, p. 133, n. 46, where Langer remarks upon t e
"conglomerations of words and babble" still found in drinking and cheering songs.
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Sendday's eve and,ah,you're vinegar! Hahahaha~
Mister Funn, you're going to be fined again!3o
Indeed Joyce's scramble of sound and sense, his foreign
words, half-words, non-words and all manner of neologism
in effect "do violence to language."

The result is a fluid

rhythmic prose in which the ordinary form of words is disrupted and restructured in most unconventional ways.

The

semantic consequence of this, as the critic Eugene Jolas
explains, is that Joyce "has been occupied in exploding the
antique logic of words. 1137 While the passage conveys a
sense of Finnegan, numerous words therein cannot literally be
defined.

The meaning is "fluid" since it is evoked by the

play of sound and rhythm and the vague suggestions of
ordinary language.
Another more familiar example (for only the critics
read Finnegans Wake) is Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky."
'Twas brillig,
Did gyre and
All mimsy were
And the mome

and the slithy troves
gimble in the wabe:
the borogroves,
raths outgrabe.

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"

36 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: The
Viking Press, 1939), p. 5.
37 EuRene Jolas, "The Revolution of Language and
James Joyce, ' James Jo ce, Finne ans Wake: A S
osium
(New York: New Directions, 19 9 , p. 83.
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'

He took his vorpal sword in hand;
Long time the manxome foe he sought-So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.
And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock with eyes of flame,
Came whiffing through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as he came!
One,twol One,two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead,and with its head
He went galumphing back.
"And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
0 frabjous day! Calloh! Callay!"
He chortled in his joy.
"Twas brillig,
Did gyre and
All mimsy were
And the mome

and the slithy toves
gimble in the wabe:
the borogroves,
raths outgrabe. 38

In undermining conventional word forms, Carroll adopts a
more sensuous and playful language than does Joyce, whose
prose is an intellectual exercise in deciphering layers of
implications and multi-lingual puns.

Like Joyce, however,

Carroll not only achieves a stylistic fluidity but he simultaneously erodes the rigidity and generality characteristic
of word meanings.

Once the ordinary structure of word and

syntax disappears, the relatively fixed meanings which
result from formulating a definition and circumscribing
words within a tidy denotative meaning begin to deteriorate.

The meaning of the new "words" is fluid in the

38 Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice (New York:
Bramhall House, 1960), pp. 191, 197.
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sense that it finds no firm and changeless definition.
Rather, it is expressive by sound sense and rhythm, which
play on conventional meanings while not being reducible to
them.

Since there is no general definition to which to

appeal, the meaning of the "word" is specified by the context in which it appears.

It takes on a particular sense

in relation to the other non-words which surround it.

Such

experimental language, though untranslatable into the
general terms of ordinary discursive language, does retain
a communicative value.

Consequently, with alterations in

linguistic form, words and propositions assume a structural
fluidity which, in turn, engenders a certain fluidity in
meaning.

In addition, the collapse of conventional forms

and their denotative meanings results in a breakdown of
semantic generality.

Since every use of the new language

is a peculiar constellation of meanings, it gains concreteness by the particular fusion of rhythms and sounds and
half-meanings which is unique to every literary passage.
Language, therefore, contains several modes of expression which attain the semantic fluidity, concreteness,
and thoroughness which Bergson requires of the "fluid
concept."

The three metaphoric uses of language, taken

together, meet each of these criteria, whereas the collapse
of conventional linguistic structure achieves concreteness,
as well as a syntactical and semantic fluidity.

Since
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language is the principal vehicle for conceiving and expressing intuitive thought, these adaptations bear the
burden of proof for the viability of the intuitive method.
The "fluid concept," which is the vehicle of intuition, has
attai~ed,

at least in terms of language, an intelligible

and defensible philosophic meaning.
Music
According to Bergson, music is especially suited
to expressing the fluid continuity of existing things.

His

observation is grounded in the fact that music is essentially temporal, and its sonorous movement through time
exhibits a continuity and qualitative variation that makes
it the very model of duration itself.

Unfortunately,

Berg-

son's view is seriously incomplete in that it deals only
with music's formal properties of temporal continuity and
heterogeneity, while neglecting its semantic power which is
inseparable from them.

By avoiding any reference to meaning

in music, Bergson overlooks two additional characteristics
which make music amenable to fluid conceptualization,
namely, that music is fluid in meaning as well as form, and
also that through its distinctive semantic it can express
vividly our thoughts and feelings.

By analyzing Bergson's

conunents on musical form, and by going beyond Bergson's
texts to examine the fluidity and concreteness of musical
meaning, I will show that music is a mode of expression
entirely appropriate to Bergson's "fluid concept."
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Bergson's discussion of music presumes that reading
a musical score and listening to the music performed can be
significantly different experiences.

On the one hand, the

musical score presents its reader with a linear succession
of discrete notes which, when played, become translated into
definite positions along a string or keyboard.

Viewed as

a system of ordered notations, music is obviously a type of
symbolic representation whose juxtaposition of discrete
points along a line is similar to the other spatial models
which the intellect unsuccessfully employs to represent the
continuous movement of time. 39 On the other hand, when
listening to music without visualizing the score or keyboard, one experiences the interpenetration of sounds, their
blend and flow into one another rather than their isolation
and juxtaposition.

It is this latter experience of music

a continuous temporal flow that leads Bergson to use
music as an analogical model of the universal duree. 40
a~

According to Bergson, continuity is evident when

39 Cf. Chapter II, p. 50.
40 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 100, 106, 111,
125; Duration and Simultaneitt, p. 44; Creative Mind, pp.
127, 147. Langer describes t e temporal flow of music in
aptly Bergsonian language: "motion is the essence of music . . . The realm in which tonal entities move is a realm
of pure duration." (Feeling and Form, pp. 107, 109-10.)
It is curious, therefore, that Langer errs by suggesting
that Bergson never saw "that his 'concrete duration,' 'lived
time,' is the prototype of 'musical time,' namely passa~e
. in its characteristic forms." (Feeling and Form, p. 11 )
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music is heard,
When we listen to a melody we have the purest impression of succession we could possibly have~an impression as far removed as possible from simultaneity~and
yet it is the very continuity of the melody and the
impossibility of breaking it up which make that impression upon us. If we cut it up into distinct notes,
into so many "befores" and "afters," we are bringing
spatial images into it and impregnating the succession
with simultaneity.41
A piece of music is an organic sonorous whole.

Its con-

tinuity resides, not in the fact that it is impossible to
distinguish individual notes or that it is impossible to
meet~with brief pauses, but rather that every note or chord,
I

every interval of soundlessness, contributes to the melodic
progression and unity of the whole piece.

The sounds and

silences work together, creating a single rhythmic flow.
Susanne Langer explains it precisely,
When a progression reaches a point of rest within a
piece, the music does not therefore stand still, but
.moves on. It moves over static harmonies and persistent tones such as pedal points, and silences. Its
forward drive may even carry it rhythmically beyond
the last sound, as in some of Beethoven's works, e.g.
~n the.finale of opus 9, no. 1, where the last measure
is a silence. 4 Z
Thus, while the written musical text represents the flow

of time with discrete motionless symbols, the music itself
restores the lost continuity by creating an auditory semblance

41 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 149. Cf. Time and Free
Will, pp. 100, 125; Duration and Simultaneity, p. 44;
Creative Mind, pp. 127, 147-48.
42 Langer, Feeling and Form, pp. 108-09. Cf. p. 113.
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of pure duration. 43
The second characteristic that makes music analogous
to Bergson's duree is its heterogeneity.

The character of

a given piece of music is determined by its tonal variation,
its changing rhythm, its range of pitch and intensity. 44
When sound is completely homogeneous, it is heard as a humm
or a buzz, anq not as music at all.

Accordingly, such

colorations witpin the musical progression, together with
I

the continuity which characterizes their deployment in time,
constitute the two formal properties of music which make it

.

,,

an appropriate model of the universal duree.
The question of how music conveys a meaning is immensely more difficult to answer.

At this point one must

take leave of the Bergsonian texts, for although Bergson's
comments on musical form invite a consideration of music's
expressive power, his philosophy neither raises nor addresses questions of meaning. 45

My principal source on the sub-

ject will be Susanne Langer who not only presents one of the

43 Bergson also observes that the unity of music,
like that of duration, is intrinsic to the process itself
and not dependent upon an auxiliary unifying principle.
(Creative Mind, pp. 127, 147)

44 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 44.
45 For this reason, one finds commentators on Bergson such as Ian Alexander and Susanne Langer admitting that
Bergson has no fully developed aesthetics. Ian W. Alexander, Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection (New York:
Hillary House, 1957), p. 85; Langer, Feeling ahd Form,
pp. 114-15.
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most solid and thorough analyses of music in contemporary
aesthetics, but who explicitly treats Bergson's position
and draws out its implications.

Since there are important

differences in the way meaning is expressed in "program
music" and in "absolute music," the following discussion
will treat each of these forms separately.
Program Music
The ability of music to convey a meaning is clearly
evident in at least one broad category of compositions
called "program music."

Such music is programmatic in so

far as it is inspired by and suggestive of an extra-musical
idea for which the music then provides an auditory semblance.
As Langer explains, program music "deliberately imitates the
clatter and cries of the market place, hoofbeats, clanging
hammers, running brooks, nightingales and bells and the inevitable cuckoo. 1146 While program music is commonly thought
to have originated around the fourteenth century, its highpoint is clearly reached in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. /Examples from this period are numerous:
Beethoven's Pa$toral Symphony (1809), Berlioz' Symphonie
Fantastique (1831), Schumann's Carnaval (1834), RimskyKorsakov's The Flight of the Bumble Bee (1872), Debussy's
La Mer (1903-05), Stravinsky's Firebird (1908) and finally,

46 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 220.
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Respighi's The Fountains of Rome (1917). 47

Each of these

various works depicts a specific scene, and several portray
an entire narrative.

How is it possible that musical tones,

which have no semantic correlate, are yet capable of expressing a meaning?
Since a musical note is pure sound, in itself signifying nothing, it is curious that a combination of notes
in deliberate patterns is evocative of meaning.

As the

above examples illustrate, music can express peasants merrymaking or the moods of the sea, a firebird or a bumble bee.
In such cases, the composer recreates objects and events in
sound simply by imitating their essential activities.

The

listener is then led by the suggestive power of the rhythm
and tone of the musical passage to envision what the composer
portrays.

The signification of "program music," then, re-

sides in its auditory simulation of familiar objects; since
it is essentially imitative, Langer finds it a rather naive,
48
. .
d mo d e o f expression.
.
unsop h 1st1cate
Although "program music" may achieve signification
by a rather simplistic technique, it confirms music as an
expressive form, capable of articulating and communicating

47

the most

Beeth~ven's Pastoral is widely considered to be

outstan~ing

48

I

example of program music.

Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 220.
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a meaning. 49

This fact is rich in implications for Berg-

son's "fluid concept."

The manner in which Beethoven sug-

gests a storm or Schumann depicts a masked ball is not altogether different from the workings of metaphor in language. 50

According to the Interaction View, when one states

"Man is a wolf," he suggests a comparison which draws upon
all possible associations of "man" and "wolf," and invites
their interplay.

A composer similarly implies a comparison

between certain sounds and the familiar objects they suggest.

The effect upon the attentive listener is that the

music (like the metaphoric word) activates his "store of
commonplace associations" which, by their convergence,
vividly recreate the thunderous storm or the lavish ball
which the composer is trying to portray.

The effectiveness

of this sound-imagery, just like the effectiveness of the
word-imagery, depends upon the breadth and vividness of
one's associations, as well as upon the ability of the
listener to allow their imaginative play.

The meaning

that program music expresses, then, is fluid, since it is
freely evoked and irreducible to a specific literal sense.
How concrete a meaning music conveys, on the one hand,
depends upon the genius of the composer to create sounds

49 Th.
.
.
II
is exp 1 ains
t h e common expression,
t h e 1anguage
of music."
50 Beethoven, Pastoral Symphony, IV The Storm Allegro; Schumann, Garnaval.
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which fire the human imagination; on the other hand, it
depends upon the receptiveness and responsiveness of the
listener which, in turn, is limited by the "store of associations" from which he draws.

Despite these subjective

considerations, music is capable of expressing meanings
which are fluid and concrete, thereby meeting the principal
requirements of Bergson's "fluid concept."
Absolute Music
When one turns to the other end of the spectrum,
"absolute music,"·signification is more difficult to explain.

"Absolute music" is thoroughly non-programmatic;

it is pure sound with no extramusical implications.

Accord-

ingly, meaning cannot be explained by the tendency of musical sound to imitate an object, but instead must be grounded
in the music itself.

The strength of Langer's theory of

significance in music is precisely this:

she is mindful

of the distinction between programmatic and absolute music,
and finds that the problem of signification occurs most
authentically in the latter.

Furthermore, she shifts at-

tention away from the subjective factors mentioned above,
and sets aside the problems of the composer and listener to
explain meaning in terms of the music itself. 51 Her approach

51 rn Philosoph¥ in a New Key, Langer effectively refutes the psychoanalytic theory which finds significance in
the self-expression of the composer, and the emotionalresponse theory which locates significance in the listener's
emotional reaction. (pp. 206-218)
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to the question of signification, therefore, is particularly
suited to "absolute music."
According to Langer, all music has a definite logical form and a peculiar semantic of its own. 52 Its conceptual content, Langer claims, is feeling. 53
If music has any significance, it is semantic, not
symptomatic. Its "meaning" is evidently not that of
a stimulus to evoke emotions, nor that of a signal to
announce them; if it has an emotional content, it
"has" its conceptual content-symbolically. It is not
usually derived from affects nor intended for them;
but, we may say that it is about them. MuSIC is not
the cau~e o~ the cure of feelings, but their logical
expression. 4
The expressive power of music cannot be adequately accounted
for in terms of a stimulus-response theory of emotion-since
music may, in fact, elicit no emotional response in the
listener and yet it conveys a meaning.

Langer argues that

music need be neither derived from an affective disposition
in the composer nor need it effect an emotional reaction in
the listener.

Rather, feeling is the conceptual content of

music, "a logical picture of sentient life," which provides
the listener with a conception of feeling, rather than an

52 Langer cites
.
Sc h open h auer as originating
. .
.
t he
theory that music is "a kind of Language" having a genuine
conceptual content. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 219.
53 Bergson also suggests, in two brief passages,
that music is expressive of feeling. Time and Free Will,
p. 15; Two Sources, pp. 252-53.
54 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 218. Cf.
p. 222.
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irrrrnediate affective experience. 55

As Langer states, in

music "the content [of emotion] has been symbolized for us,
and what it invites is not emotional response, but insight.1156
How does music express this feeling if the notations which compose it cannot be literally defined and are
not inherently meaningful?

Langer finds that the ability

of music to symbolize emotion resides in the fact "that
musical structures logically resemble certain dynamic patterns of human experience. 1157 Musical form, she suggests,
is the embodiment of feeling, since
there are certain aspects of the so-called "inner
life"-physical or mental-which have formal properties similar to those of music-patterns of motion
and rest, of tension and release, of agreement and
disagreement, preparation, fulfillment, excitation,
sudden change, etc.58
The expressive power of music lies in the fact that its
formal properties are analogous to those of our subjective
experience.

The conceptual content of music resides pre-

cisely in the tonal patterns and rhythms of which it is
composed.

Our difficulty in recognizing significance in

music is due largely to the fact that we are conditioned

55 Philosophy in a New Key, p. 222.
56 Ibid., p. 223.
57 Ibid., p. 226.
58
Ibid., p. 228.
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to expect meanings to be namable and definable as they are
in discursive language. 59 Music, on the contrary, has no
literal meaning; it is what Langer calls an "unconsummated
symbol."
Music
bolic form,
is an unconsummate sym o .
rticu ation is its i e,
but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression.
The actual function of meaning, which calls for permanent contents, is not fulfilled; for the assignment
of one rather than another possible meaning to each
form is never explicitly made.60
Absolute music has an unconventional significative power.
It is incapable of exact, literal translation, yet clearly
it conveys, by its harmonies and dissonances, by its melodic
progressions and abrupt changes, the very rhythm of the
sentient life itself.

It gives no precise delineations of

feeling, but expresses instead its general forms.

The musi-

cal semantic is characterized by a certain "ambivalence
of content," whereby meaning is a vast interplay of evocative sounds.

Langer explains it well:

Music is revealing, where words are obscuring, because
it can have not only a content, but a transient play of
contents. It can articulate feelings without becoming
wedded to them . . . . the assignment of meaning is a
shifting kaleidoscopic Elay, probably below the threshold of discursive thin ing.61
The parallel between musical signification and the diaphor

59 __
Ph'l
h y_i_n_a
. . __
Ne_w__
Ke_.Y..... p . 228 .
i_o_s_o__p___
60 Ibid., p. 240.
61 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

Italics mine.
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in language is strikingly obvious.

Just as the diaphor is

an interplay of several images whose meanings converge to
depict a particular object, so too the emotive overtones of
musical sounds engage in a "kaleidoscopic play," and finally
blend to express the dominant feeling which pervades the
musical composition.

This "transient play of contents" is

both the weakness and the strength of musical symbolism.
It is its weakness in so far as the emotion expressed is
general and imprecise; it is its strength because this same
thoroughly non-representational character of absolute music
enables it to "be 'true' to the life of feeling in a way
that language cannot. 1162 In summary, then, the semantic
fluidity Bergson requires of the "new concept" seems to be
thoroughly attained, since a single denotative meaning is a
virtual impossibility given the nature of musical notation.
The question of how concrete a grasp of feeling music offers
is a bit more difficult to assess.

The necessary vagueness

and generality inherent in musical symbolism seems to argue
against this possibility, yet anyone who has listened to a
Beethoven sonata or a Chopin polonaise must acknowledge that
one's insight into the life of feeling can be concrete and
vivid indeed.
In conclusion, then, the criteria of fluidity and
concreteness which Bergson establishes for the "new concept"

62

Philosophy in a New Key, p. 243.
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are clearly fulfilled by music.

As an expressive form

whose medium is time itself, music is a thoroughly continuous movement and, as such, is the closest approximation to
the fluidity of pure duration.

On the level of meaning,

music exhibits fluidity in so far as it freely evokes
images and feelings, the interaction of which constitute a
new semantic with no literal equivalent.

Music grasps the

concrete particularity of an object, event or feeling to the
extent that the listener can be responsive to the music's
evocative powers, and to the extent that the composer and
performer can elicit that response.
Art
A final consideration in explicating Bergson's
"fluid concept" is the visual arts of painting and sculpture
which, at first glance, seem entirely inappropriate as expressive forms of the new concept.

Even Bergson's few

references to the arts reveal his cognizance of the problem. 63

First of all, the visual arts are spatial, and

whether space be two-dimensional as in painting or threedimensional as in sculpture, both media inherit the problems which infect all spatial symbolism.

Just as the jux-

taposition of points on a line extended in space cannot

63
Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 15-16; Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 22, 32-33.
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express the uninterrupted flow of time, 64 so too painting
with its collection of static images, and sculpture with its
organization of motionless forms, seem ill-suited to the
representation of the intuited duree.

As Bergson consis-

tently argues, "the fixed placed side by side with the
fixed will never constitute anything which has duration. 1165
In addition to this formal inertia, the visual arts
are also limited in the point of view they present.

When

looking at a painting, we are afforded only one invariable
perspective on the artist's subject.

Although we may ob-

serve a painting from near or far, high or low, right or
left, we cannot alter the fundamental view which is already
established on the canvas.

We cannot get a profile of

Leonardo's "Mona Lisa," nor can we ask the woman in Andrew
Wyeth's "Christina's World" to turn around. 66 While freestanding sculpture allows us to utilize three-dimensional
space~to

tives on

move around the object and take various perspecit~we

always remain exrernal to the object at a

specific point in space, unable to take more than a single

64 see Chapter I, pp. 11-12.
65 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 16.
66Wh'l
.
. painting
. .
i e t h e use o f perspective
in
can
create the illusion of three-dimensional space, the viewer
cannot move around or behind objects to exploit that threedimensionality.

r
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view at a time. 67

Even if we were to exhaust the infinite

number of possible points of view, which is unlikely, we
would only return to the initial problem:

the medium of

the plastic arts presents only a single, frozen moment of
its object.

Although we can vary our point of view, we

cannot vary the fixed attitude of the representation itself. 68

Painting and sculpture, therefore, being stable

in form and selective in the perspectives they allow, seem
incapable of expressing the fluidity and full particularity
of an enduring world.
To regard a painting simply as a collection of lines
and colors placed side by side on a canvas, or to regard
sculpture as an extension of material shapes in space, is
to overlook completely their function as symbolic forms.
Whether the visual arts are objective or non-objective,
representational or abstract, their lines, colors, textures,
tones and shapes taken together embody a meaning.

What is

merely a collection of formal properties becomes significative when the disparate elements interact to form a unitary expression.

This occurs, according to Langer, as the

artist borrows forms from the real world, organizes them in

67 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 22,
32-33.
68 See Chapter II, pp. 39-41. This is the same
problem encountered in intellectual analysis when one
assumes a point of view external to the object.

....

106
the virtual space of the painting or sculpture, and employs
them to express vital and emotive conceptions. 69 In distinctly Bergsonian language, she describes the fusion of
form and meaning which results.
This characteristic way in which the artist presents
his formal structure in a single exemplification is,
I think, what makes it impossible to divorce the logical form from its embodiment or expression. We never
pass beyond the work of art, the vision, to something
separately thinkable, the logical form, and from this
to the meaning it conveys, a feeling that has this
same form. The dynamic form of feeling is seen in the
picture, not through it mediately; the feeling itself
seems to be in the picture. Symbolic form, symbolic
function, and symbolized import are all telescoped in
one experience, a perception of beauty and an intuition
of significance.70
Langer's insistence on the integrity of the work of art
dispels the notion of color, line, shape, etc. as elements
which stand juxtaposed in space.

Theirs is no longer an

external relation of mere proximity, but a tensive interplay which evokes a meaning. 71 Just as the metaphoric
images in a poem are unified by the presiding theme which
pervades them, 72 so too in the visual arts the formal ingredients do not stand indifferently side by side, but

69 Bergson too finds art an expression of feeling.
Although the idea is never fully developed, it receives brief
discussion in Time and Free Will, pp. 16-18.
70 susanne Langer, Problems of Art, (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 33-34. Cf. Feeling and
Form, pp. 51-52.
71 cf. Alexander, Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection,
p. 92.
72 see pp. 79-82 .
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interact to express the thought or feeling they symbolize.
Examples from both representational and abstract art will
show that the effect of this form-meaning interaction is not
only a more fluid, but also more complete grasp of the subject they symbolize.
Representational art varies widely, from an extreme
realism in which the artist is entirely faithful to his object, to vaguer, more suggestive portrayals which, while not
faithful to their objects in every detail, do offer recognizable representations of them.

However realistic a paint-

ing or sculpture, Bergson and Langer agree that it does not
exist simply for the practical purpose of producing a flawless, literal description of a person, place or thing, (al. may we 11 b e among its
.
t h oug h t h is
accomp 1.is hments ) ; 73
rather, its function as an artistic form is primarily to
say something about the object, to convey to our understanding the feeling of its vital reality.

For example,

Michelangelo's David, while being of heroic proportions, is
thoroughly realistic.

The anatomical exactness which

Michelangelo achieves is legendary.

As the critic Frederick

Hartt explains, every detail of arms, legs, torso and face
are perfectly calculated to the posture and mood of the
youthful figure.
The sinews of the neck seem to tense and relax, the

73 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 136-38; Langer,
Feeling and Form, p. 51.
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veins of the neck, hands, and wrists to fill, the nostrils to pinch, the belly muscles to contract and to
shrink and erect, the whole proud being to quiver like
a war horse that smells the battle.74
The figure of David, however realistic, is not a lesson in
human anatomy, but an expressive form in which every vein
and muscle signifies "all the passionate drama of man's
inner nature. 1175 The parts of the body, their diverse
shapes and textures, are not external and in juxtaposition
to each other, but are tensively interrelated to convey a
dramatic sense of the life and feeling of bold, impassioned
youth.

The formal elements embody the meaning, and the

meaning resides in the organic unity of the formal elements.
The result is not a static image, but a vital symbol of
restlessness and tension.

It does not eradicate movement

and activity, but distills it.

Thus, the single moment of

the figure which Michelangelo presents is limiting only
insofar as the viewer fails to perceive the whole range of
life and feeling condensed within it.

Its significative

power depends not only upon the interplay of content and
form in the sculpture itself, but also upon the ability of
the viewer to be responsive to its presentation.

Since the

meaning conveyed by the statue emerges out of the dynamic
interplay of its formal properties and our associations, it

74 Frederick Hartt, Michelan~elo: The Complete Sculp(New York: Harry N. Adams, 1 68), pp. 104-105.
75 Ibid., p. 105.
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is irreducible to any literal translation.

Accordingly,

even an inert, realistic form has vital symbolic powers
which express, more deeply and more powerfully than any
discursive formulation can, the fullness and fluidity of
immediate experience.
Whether the art form is painting or sculpture,
whether it is objective or non-objective, the same expressive possibilities exist.

In the move away from highly

representational art to more abstract visual forms, there
is a liberation from our habitual ways of seeing by distorting familiar objects or even avoiding objective representation altogether. 76 By displacing our routine perceptions
with novel, imaginative modes of thought and feeling, such
modern movements as Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism
and Fauvism have attempted to enhance the evocative power
of the visual arts.

For example, Van Gogh's Wheat Fields

and Cypress Trees, while still presenting the familiar objects the title suggests, does not afford a faithful, literal
depiction of them.

Yet, by the use of fluid lines, comple-

mentary colors and, above all, a coarse rhythmic texture,
Van Gogh dramatically portrays the movement of clouds and
cypress and wheat in the summer wind.

What Van Gogh achieves

76
Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 135-38. Bergson
finds that the artist's role is precisely to extend our
powers of perception by creating new ways of seeing. Bergson's earlier suggestion that intuition break with habitual
modes of perception is well illustrated. See Chapter II,
p. 59.
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is not a literal transcription of objects, but the evocation
of a vital emotional experience of them.

In such objective

but not entirely realistic art, the formal fluidity is obtained by the indulgence in lyrical color and line, and the
objects are expressed fully and concretely due to the exaggeration of their most expressive features.
This principle of gaining expressive power by departing from familiar, literal representations is taken to
its logical conclusion in totally non-objective, abstract
art.

From the numerous examples provided by the paintings

of Jean Dubuffet, Jackson Pollock, Piet Mondriaan and the
sculpture of Constanti Brancusi, Henry Moore, Alexander
Calder and others, let us examine Pollock's Full Fathom
Five.

The predominant feeling in the painting is that of

dense and gnarled confusion.

The tangle of lines and the

neutrality of color relieved only by a few smatterings of
faint orange combine to create the presiding image.

With-

out any objective reference whatsoever, Pollock expresses
an emotional conception with definiteness by creating a
chaos and tense resistance within the maze of line and color.
What the painting demonstrates is that abstract art no less
than representational visual forms is capable of expressing
a meaning by the interaction of formal elements within a
virtual space.

While its images are divorced from the real

world, its shapes, colors, textures and lines are rich with
associations and highly evocative.

By drawing from our
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lived associations, the artist can often evoke a more dramatic and vivid conception than can a less imaginative,
more realistic portrayal.
What this brief review of representational and
abstract art has shown is that the artist mobilizes the
static elements of line, color, shape and texture in order
to convey a meaning.

The movement or play among these

formal properties themselves, not only gives fluid expression to the subject presented, but reaches beyond the inert
and singular perspective portrayed on the canvas or in the
sculpture to capture the very life of the idea or feeling
it expresses.

As with language and music, our responsive-

ness to the work of art will, in large part, determine how
concrete and complete a grasp of its subject the visual
form can allow.

What is clear, however, is that the visual

arts are capable of expressing our innnediate experience,
without sacrificing either its concrete particularity or
its mobile duree.

Accordingly both painting and sculpture

qualify as expressive forms of Bergson's "fluid concept."
Language, music and art, then, each in their respective ways has accomplished the two objectives which Bergson
set out for the new concept, namely, that it must be capable
of "adopting the very movement of the inward life of things,"
and that it "must be cut to the exact measure of the object,"
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77
.
. 1 arity,
.
grasping
i. t s f u 11 particu

The relative merits of

these expressive forms are difficult to assess, principally
because each has a distinctive semantic which is constituted
by its own linguistic, auditory or artistic forms.
In terms of their capacity to express mobility,
musical and artistic forms seem to occupy the far ends of
the spectrum, the former being the most purely temporal of
expressive forms and the latter being essentially inert and
spatial.

These extremes collapse, however, when the formal

properties of music and art are analyzed in terms of their
power to express a meaning.

Art is no longer a juxtaposition

.of visual forms in space, but a field for their dynamic interplay.

Art becomes a visual mobilization of color, shape

and line which constitutes a unified thought or feeling.
Thus art is not as distant from music as it first appears.
Music similarly begins with static notations which, when
translated into sound, blend and flow to create a meaning.
Both achieve a semantic fluidity by means of a fluidity in
form~although

in art the movement is visual, whereas in

music it is auditory.
In respect to the question of fluidity, language
has certain affinities with both art and music.

Like art,

its basic structure is essentially spatial, its words and

77

Cf. Chapter II, p. 58.
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sentences are set out side by side in linear fashion.
Language, however, overcomes the inertness and spatiality
of its formal properties as the connotations and denotations
of words blend to form new meanings which, especially in the
case of metaphor, create a complex and fluid semantic which
is irreducible to the separate words of which it is composed.

As with art, the formal inertia of language is over-

come when its discrete parts mobilize to create a new constellation of meaning.

Language, being an auditory as well

as a visual form, attains a sonorous temporal flow whenever
it is spoken.
respect.

Language differs from music in one important

However fluid prose or poetry becomes, its individ-

ual units retain a distinctness insofar as each is intrinsically meaningful, whereas the notes in a musical composition
only take on meaning in relation to one another as the sound
unfolds.

When the discrete meanings of words are broken

down by a collapse of their form, however, language enjoys
greater affinity with music, in that its individual units
cease to be meaningful when taken alone and now derive expressive power only as their sounds and half-meanings blend
and flow into one another.
How well language, music and art can express the
concrete, particular features of their objects is more
difficult to determine.

When we consider a realistic paint-

ing or sculpture, or an exact linguistic description, both
seem eminently capable of a detailed and quite specific
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portrayal of their subject; program music, on the other hand,
creates an auditory impression which is less literally explicit and more evocative.

But if the preceding analysis

of these expressive forms is correct, then the most literal
depictions are not necessarily most capable of grasping
reality in its full particularity.

If reality is a fluid

process of continuous change, as Bergson suggests, then
literal descriptions fail precisely because they are too
confining~because

in an effort to pinpoint and specify an

object or experience they forfeit its continuous mobility
and vitality.

Thus it is that metaphorical uses of language,

and absolute music and abstract art may be capable of more
faithful and more exact expressions of the immediately experienced world.

Their expressive power lies in their

ability to evoke our most vivid associations, to incite the
imaginative play of our thoughts, feelings and memories.
Their efficacy resides in their ability to call up these
deeply personal associations which, in the process of their
interaction, give a deep, comprehensive and concrete sense
of the reality they symbolize.
My examination of the linguistic, musical and
artistic forms of Bergson's "fluid concept" is now complete.
My objective was to interpret and specify the nature of the
new concept in order to accomplish several things:

first

to show that Bergson's notion of the "fluid concept" does
have a positive content, since language, music and art, each
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in varying degrees, fulfill its specific requirements;
second, to show that the intuitive method, which is dependent for its operations upon the "fluid concept," is not
simply a flash understanding incapable of symbolic representation but a viable mode of knowing with a wide range of
symbolic forms.

The linguistic, musical and artistic forms

of the "fluid /concept" provide logical forms whereby one
can think intuitively and give overt expressions to these
conceptualizations. 78 Finally, my aim was to show that, if
the intuitive method is a viable mode of knowing, one could
take seriously the disclosures based upon it.
disclosure is the universal
of Bergson's metaphysics.

duree~the

One such

fundamental principle

If pure duration can be grasped

intuitively, the question remains as to how, if at all, such
intuitive claims can be verified.

I will consider this in

the final chapter.
When Bergson recommends that philosophy adopt the
intuitive method, some additional questions arise.

In the

context of our preceding discussion of the "fluid concepts"
upon which intuition relies, and the linguistic and musical

78 Bergson fails to explicitly state whether one thinks
linguistically, musically and artistically or whether one
thinks according to unspecified "fluid concepts" which then
find overt expression in these symbolic forms. The first
interpretation is the only defensible one, since conception
requires logical form and, even if this form is fluid, it
marks one's advance beyond rudimentary perceptions, while
also allowing for organized mental conceptions independent of
their extra-mental expressions.
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and artistic forms in which they find expression, Bergson's
suggestion seems curious indeed.

Does Bergson intend phil-

osophy to become dissipated in poetry and novels, in symphonies and paintings, with no distinct identity of its own?
Does this imply that philosophy should forsake its scientific
rigor and precision for more artistic, metaphorical modes of
thought?

The implications of Bergson's epistemology and

aesthetics for his theory of philosophic activity will be
the topic of the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION:

THE CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY

Coextensive with Bergson's development of the
theory of intuition is his proposal that philosophy, and
in particular metaphysics, adopt the intuitive method.
This recommendation is thoroughly consistent with Bergson's
metaphysical and epistemological suppositions.

According

to Bergson, metaphysics seeks a pure, disinterested knowledge of reality as it essentially
poral flow.

is~a

continuous tem-

His epistemological distinction between intel-

lectual analysis and intuition is clearly elaborated with
the metaphysician in mind.

Whereas intellectual analysis

is a method of knowing which stabilizes and orders the
fluid temporality of existing things in order to provide a
firm foundation for action, 1 intuition is devoid of practical interest and designed to facilitate an immediate
grasp of duration as duration. 2 Thus, the intuitive method
is, by definition, commensurate with the objectives of
metaphysics.

1 see Chapter II, pp. 47-48.
2 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 39-40.
For Bergson the alternative is clear: "Either there is no
117
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However logically coherent Bergson's recommendation
is in terms of his other philosophical claims, it seems
upon closer examination to pose more problems than it
solves.

Numerous questions arise concerning both the meth-

odology and discourse of this new intuitive philosophy.
First of all, does the theory of intuition, as described by
Bergson, provide a method at all?

Does Bergson establish a

definite procedure which philosophers can employ to obtain
knowledge about the world?
disclosures be verified?

If so, then how can intuitive
Inseparable from these methodo-

logical considerations are questions pertaining to philosophic discourse.

If ordinary discursive language is in-

appropriate to intuition, as Bergson suggests, then is the
philosopher permitted, or even encouraged, to use nondiscursive forms?

Do music and art, which are similarly

non-discursive, have any legitimate role in the philosophic
enterprise?

Does Bergson's suggestion for a discourse

appropriate to intuition require that philosophy forsake
its aim of clarity and precision, adopting artistic modes
of expression which are more elusive and difficult to test?
A closer look at these questions hopefully will

philosophy possible, and all knowledge of things is a practical knowledge aimed at the profit to be drawn from them,
or else philosophy consists in placing oneself within the
object itself by an effort of intuition." Cf. Introduction
to Metaphysics, pp. 24, 27, 30, 37, 49, 51-52, 60; MindEnerf~· p. 6; Cr~ative Evolution, pp. 34-35; Creative Mind,
pp.
• 30-32, 37, 61, 107-29, 138.
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serve to integrate the metaphysical and epistemological
issues previously elaborated in this study, to draw out the
full implications of Bergson's rather innovative philosophy
of expression, and finally, to give an overview of Bergson's
theory of philosophic activity which pervades and unifies
his other philosophic concerns.
Intuition as Philosophic Method
Speaking of Bergson as well as other intuitionist
philosophers, Susanne Langer states, "intuition is not a
'method' at all, but an event. 113

Her verdict is puzzling

to the reader of Bergson who finds, from the fntroduction
to Metaphysics onward, countless references to intuition
as a viable philosophic method.

Several commentators

on Bergson, such as Carr, Chevalier and Kahn, have taken
seriously Bergson's suggestion and have offered substantial
discussions of his intuitive methodology. 4 My interpretation in this paper has sided with those who discover in
Bergson's theory of intuition the delineation of a philosophic method; in addition to being swayed by Bergson's

3

Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 378.

4H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Change, pp. 119; Jacques Chevalier, "The Method, Intuition and the
Philosophic Mind," Henri Bergson, trans. by Lilian A. Clare
(New York: AMS Press, 1969), pp. 74-113; Sholom J. Kahn,
"Henri Bergson's Method," Antioch Review, V (September,
1945), 440-51.
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own explicit statements on the subject, 5 I find that
Bergson describes intuition, not simply as an "event," but
as a formal procedure with definite stages, designed to
accomplish a specific end.
As discussed at length in Chapter II, intuition is
a cognitive process consisting of three stages. 6 The first
is perception in which the mind obtains a non-positional
view of the object, by seizing it immediately as it is in
itself.

This direct apprehension requires that one per-

ceive the object non-spatially, relinquishing one's external
point of view in favor of "entering into" the object itself.
In the second stage, one's original perceptions are raised
to the level of conception where they obtain the logical
form of the "fluid concept."

At this stage, intuition has

ceased to be a mere "event" and has taken on symbolic forms
which make intuitive thinking, or conceiving, possible.
Finally, the "fluid conceptions" receive overt expression
in such media as language, music and art. 7 This third
stage confirms the fact that intuition is neither private

5 see Chapter IV, n. 2.
6see Chapter II, pp. 52-60.
7The distinction between "fluid concepts" as forms
of conception and as forms of expression is discussed in
Chapter III, pp. 114-15. However, legitimate the epistemological distinction between conceiving and expressing, one
should be mindful of Bergson's ambiguity as to the exact
nature of the distinction.
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nor incommunicable, but rather is able to adopt expressive
forms which convey a meaning and which, especially in the
case of music and art, have almost universal intelligibility. 8

All three stages are unified by a single aim, to

attain knowledge of reality as the pure duration that it is.
Intuition, therefore, meets the fundamental requirements of a formal method:

it is an established procedure

with recognizable stages, which occur in a definite logical
sequence and cooperate toward a single end.

Once delineated,

these successive stages form an integral methodology which,
at least in principle, is independent of the thematic considerations in the context of which it was framed.
Evaluation of this method is much more difficult
than its description.

One reason for this is

~hat

although

Bergson's rationale for the intuitive method is clear, especially in view of his criticisms of intellectual analysis,
its final test rests upon its implementation.

While Bergson

8Music is among the most universal of expressive
forms. Even if we must train our ear to appreciate the
music of foreign cultures, such appreciation is facilitated
by the fact that musical notation is not tied to any cultural semantic. While artistic symbols are somewhat more
culture-bound, people most often seem capable of perceiving
a universal element intrinsic to them which goes beyond the
particular time and place in which the art was produced.
The prominence of Oriental or African or primitive art in
most American museums attests to this trans-cultural value
of the artistic medium. Language is possibly the least
universal in that words and their meanings are quite particular to the peoples who use them. However successful a
translation may be, it can never deliver adequately the full
sense of the original text.
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has specified what needs to be accomplished, he is obscure
on the crucial question of how.
is a case in point.

His theory of perception

Bergson critizes the analytical method

for adopting a point of view external to its object, thereby introducing space and preventing the apprehension of pure
time.

One solution to this spatializing tendency is to re-

linquish one's outside point of view in preference to perceiving the object "from where it is, as it is in itself."
But exactly how one avoids taking a point of view or how one
enters into the object is never fully explained.

Bergson's

difficulty in setting out this first stage of the intuitive
method is his inability to adequately account for its implementation.

Similarly, at each stage Bergson defines the

objectives of intuition, that it should enter into the object and that it should conceive and express the object as it
is.

Yet how this is to be accomplished is described only

negatively.

Bergson simply suggests that we avoid external

points of view and avoid the static and partial concepts of
analysis in our thought and expression.

Thus, Bergson's

problem is not that he has failed to provide a methodology,
but that he has failed to delineate its procedures specifically and clearly enough to facilitate its use.
Another problem which besets the intuitive method
is that of verification.

If intuition is to be a viable

method of knowing, Bergson must determine how the truth and
accuracy of intuitive disclosures can be tested.

Bergson's
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account is twofold:

first, he claims that there is a cer-

tain self-evidence to an intuition which is confirmed simply
by its capacity to be expressed; and second, that the insight
gained intuitively is verified when the method of intellectual analysis arrives at the same truth.

These two sug-

gestions bear further examination.
Bergson's earliest statement on the topic of verification occurs in 1911, in an essay on "Philosophical Intuition."
Doubtless everything is not equally verified or verifiable in what a philosophy brings us, and it is the
essence of the philosophical method to demand that at
many moments, on many points, the mind should take risks.
But the philosopher runs the risk only because there are
thin s of which he feels himself unshakeabl certain.
e wi
ma e us certain to t e extent t at e is a e to
communicate to us the intuition from which he draws his
strength.9
Bergson is on shaky ground for several reasons.

First of

all, he claims that the element of risk in philosophic method
explains "why everything is not equally verified or verif iable."

Ordinarily, a tentative hypothesis initiates the

verification

process~either

the original thesis is confirmed

or denied as additional evidence is collected.

Thus even

though philosophy may involve risk, this does not obviate
the need for verification, so much as establish its urgency.
Secondly, when Bergson states, "there are things
of which the philosopher feels himself unshakeably certain,"

9Bergson, Cre•tiVe Mind, pp. 123-24.

Italics mine.
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two further problems arise.

One is that the grounds for the

philosopher's initial certainty is unclear.

Is his certainty

established by a vague, pre-reflective insight or is it
grounded in a deliberate process of reflection?

This ques-

tion introduces the problem of the fundamental nature of
intuitive knowing which Bergson, in his own mind, seems
never to have entirely resolved.lo

Furthermore, when Berg-

son refers to the fact that "the philosopher feels himself
unshakeably certain," he seems to be suggesting that intuitions are self-verifying, that their truth is evident to the
person who is having the intuition.
untenable.

This, taken alone, is

Not only is it impossible to prove or disprove

the truth of such an intuition (except of course by having
the intuition oneself), but even if the experience is had,
there are no firm criteria by which truth and false can be
discriminated.
Thirdly, Bergson states that others will be convinced of the philosopher's certainty only to the extent
that he can communicate his intuition.

Since communication

is clearly necessary to establish the certainty of an intuition in the philosophic community, and since the most able
vehicle for the expression of an intuitive thought is the
"fluid concept," a philosopher's credibility finally rests
upon his skill in manipulating those expressive forms which

10 see Chapter IV, pp. 128 -29:for a more detailed
examination of this problem.
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meet its requirements.

Bergson also implies that an unex-

pressed or poorly expressed idea has no claim to certainty.
The other assumption which his. statement harbors is seriously in error.

Bergson fails to acknowledge the crucial dif-

ference between a statement being true and being persuasive.
Consequently, Bergson is led unawares to the implausible
conclusion that an argument's persuasiveness is a mark of
its truth.

An example from Bergson's own philosophy readily

shows how unsound a principle this is.

Recognizing how

compelling the theory of spatialized time has been, Bergson
strenuously argues against its continued acceptance on the
basis that it is an utterly false, distortive view of the
temporal process.

If a persuasive idea can thus be false,

then persuasiveness is entirely inadequate as a measure of
truth.
Bergson's second principle of verification at first
might seem to rest on more solid ground.

In this case, an

intuitive apprehension is confirmed by the findings of intellectual analysis.
As the diver feels out the wreck on the sea floor that
the aviator has pointed out from the air, so the intellect immersed in the conceptual environment verifies
from point to point, by contact, analytically, what has
been the object of a synthetic and super-intellectual
vision.11
Despite the difference between the intuitive and analytic

11 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 64.
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methodologies, which is the very foundation of Bergson's
epistemology, he is insisting here upon their complementary
functions.

If intuition is employed by the metaphysician,

for example, his disclosures can be confirmed and elaborated
by other sciences which proceed more analytically. 12 Interestingly enough, Capek finds that this is precisely what
happened relative to Bergson's own duration theory.

In The

Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, Capek observes that Bergson's notion of duration, which is among the
principal revelations of intuition, is supported in the main
by the findings of quantum mechanics and relativity theory
whose scientific methods are clearly more analytical than
intuitive in nature. 13 This reinforces Bergson's claim in
the above passage that the insight provided by intuition can
be substantiated and verified by the data of analysis.
The second principle of verification is fraught with
even more serious problems than the first.

One immediately

is led to question whether unsubstantiated intuitions
have any claim to truth, and whether the intuitive method
has any independent value if its ideas require the further
evidence of a non-intuitive methodology.

Both of these

12 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 53-56,
60; Creative Mind, pp. 37-44, 124-26. Cf. Chevalier, Henri
Bergson, pp. 110-13.
13 capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary
Physics, pp. 22, 286-87.
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concerns, however, are overshadowed by the much more urgent
and fundamental question of how two methodologies as different as intuition and intellectual analysis can ever

arrive

at the same truth.
Bergson argues that they can for two reasons.

First,

Bergson claims that science, proceeding by the analytic
method, eventually will delve deeply enough into the material
universe that matter will "surrender its inner structure,"
and science will reach the absolute reality of matter as it
is in itself. 14 However different their methods, Bergson
maintains that science and metaphysics "will conrrnune in
experience. 1115 This statement is perplexing in the light of
Bergson's basic epistemological assumption that different
modes of knowing disclose fundamentally different worlds.
Bergson has argued much more convincingly in our previous
chapters, that our ability to see the world is structured
by the point of view we assume in perception, as well as by
the concepts through which we give the perceived world a
logical form.

What enables the intuitive mind to apprehend

duree is precisely the fact that every stage of its method
achieves a fluid and concrete grasp of its objects; what
prohibits analysis from ever knowing duration as duration is
its tendency, from the initial stage of perception onward,

14 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 40-44.
15
Ibid., p. 44.
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to introduce spatial categories and thereby forfeit time.
How then can metaphysics and science, whose view

of the

world is confined to the scope and purpose of their respective methods, ever "connnune in experience?"
The second argument which Bergson offers on behalf
of the complementarity of intuition and analysis is actually
a reply to this objection.

In: an Tn:troduction: to Metaphysics,
!

Bergson maintains that the connnon basis of an intuitive met,a!

physics and an analytical science is intuition itself.
Analysis originates in a kind of primal intuition which it
then formulates according to the perceptual and conceptual
schemes of its distinctive methodology.

As Bergson states,

"the simple act which started the analysis, and which conceals itself behind the analysis, proceeds from a faculty
quite different from the analytical. This is, by its very
definition, intuition. 1116 If this is so, then Bergson must
admit to a basic confusion regarding the nature of intuition.
If intuitive insight precedes its conceptualization according to the analytical method rather than emerging in the
process of it, then intuition must be a pre-reflective apprehension of the world which grounds all our reflection.
What Bergson is suggesting here is that metaphysics and
science are simply divergent responses to the same primitive
intuition; their ability to connnune with each other resides

16
Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 60.
Italics mine.
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in the fact

that their point of departure is the same.

In order to maintain this thesis, Bergson has to
undermine his entire epistemology.

One of the most obvious

problems is his equivocal use of the term intuition.

On the

one hand, it refers to an elusive, pre-reflective insight,
and on the other hand, it refers to an established method
which formulates one's intuitive apprehensions on the level
of reflection.

Acceptance of the first meaning, while it

saves Bergson's verification theory by accounting for the
connnunicability of metaphysics and science, obviates the
need for an intuitive method by providing, in advance, the
same insight one would gain more laboriously by working
through its formal procedures.

This would undermine the

distinction between analysis and intuition by stripping intuition of its methodological stages which, in turn, would
entail the collapse of metaphysics or any philosophy which
relies upon them.

In conclusion, then, I would maintain

that intuition is a method, not only because its definite
stages are delineated by Bergson, but because it is the
only interpretation of intuition which is truly viable within the context of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology.
Abandoning the theory that intuition is a pre-reflective
apprehension of the world from which analysis begins, Bergson is unable to account for the
confirm the findings of intuition.

fact

that analysis can

Thus, according to

Bergson's second principle of verification, intuition
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remains unverifiable.
Final evaluation of Bergson's proposal that intuition be adopted as philosophic method must be tentative.

I

have argued that Bergson's theory of intuition does provide
a methodology, and one which is tailored to the needs of the
metaphysician as Bergson perceives them.

Important questions

remain, however, concerning the practicability of the method
itself and concerning the adequacy of the verification procedures by which the truth of intuitive insights can be
tested.

These issues, being finally irresolvable within the

Bergsonian corpus, bring the present study to an impasse.
Although the operations and vocabulary of the intuitive
method have been clarified in the preceding chapters, the
implementation of the method and the verifiability of its
claims cannot be firmly established.

A philosopher's re-

luctance to employ the intuitive method would be well grounded
in the fact that Bergson gives no satisfactory treatment to
these most crucial concerns.

Bergson's neglect in this re-

gard casts a long shadow over one of his most original and at
times most promising suggestions.
New Directions for Philosophic Discourse
Despite the problems which beset the intuitive
method in general, the philosophy of expression which is
an outgrowth of the intuitive theory has fertile implications for philosophic discourse.

w

When Bergson recommends
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that the philosopher employ intuition as a means of comprehending the world, it follows that the philosopher must
express his intuitions in the only forms entirely adequate
to them, namely, the linguistic, musical and artistic adaptations to the "fluid concept."

Is the philosopher thereby

constrained to use metaphorical language, to write a musical
composition or to paint a picture in order to satisfactorily
communicate his insight?

Can a philosopher experiment with

non-discursive forms of expression and retain the integrity
of his discipline, or must philosophy properly so called
remain within the bounds of the conventional semantic and
logic of discursive language?
In this as in so many other contexts, Bergson's
explicit comments are few.

His theory of philosophic dis-

course exists only insofar as it can be drawn, by implication, from his theory of intuition and his philosophy of
expression.

Whether Bergson unequivocally endorses all

non-discursive forms of expression as appropriate to philosophic discourse is difficult to say.

However intriguing

the suggestion that a philosopher could express his ideas
in music or art, perhaps even more effectively than in
language, the prospect of such a broad understanding of
philosophic "discourse" presents numerous problems.
Although people often speak of the philosophic
import of a piece of music or art, adopting these media as
the principal vocabulary of philosophy would create problems

r
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more serious than those they remedy.

Despite their capa-

bilities for expressing the fluidity and particularity of
existing things more adequately than can discursive forms,
music and art prove ill-suited to philosophic discourse.
The reasons are several.

First, what would be the differ-

ence between a musician or artist being philosophical and
a philosopher being musical or artistic?

If the difference

between philosophy and these other forms is imperceptible
or merely semantic, all three disciplines lose their autonomy, the identity of each is not enriched but dissolved.
Second, the "vocabulary" of music and art is problematic.
These forms convey a meaning not by literal description
but by evocation; their mode is presentational, not argumentative.

Thus, while ideas can be musically expressed

with power and definiteness, they cannot be placed in the
logical mold of premise and conclusion.

While the for-

feiture of these conveniences is compensated for by avoiding
the many problems of discursiveness, it creates the further
difficulty of devising a new methodology and reestablishing
new criteria of truth.

Third, since music and art resist

literal translation, communicating their full import would
be impossible outside the media themselves.

To imagine

philosophers debating musically or artistically is as
ludicrous as it is impracticable.

Closely related is the

rather obvious problem that music and art are less accessible
than language to the wider human community.

If most people
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communicate less readily and less well in these nonlinguistic forms, then philosophy fosters an elitism by
narrowing the range of its practitioners and of its audience.
These observations are designed to temper, not
destroy, the rich implications of Bergson's aesthetics.

To

find music and art inappropriate to philosophic discourse
is not to diminish or deny their effectiveness as expressive
forms.

Bergson's assessment of music and art as vital means

of conveying the pure temporality and full particularity of
existing things urges the philosopher to be receptive to
their distinctive semantic, and to derive its insight as a
valuable supplement to his own.
Language, whether spoken or written, has traditionally been the medium for the expression of philosophic
thought.

Its practical advantages over music and art are

obvious.

Language is an expressive form in which numerous

ideas and subtle variations of thought and feeling can be
communicated with considerable economy and precision, in a
form that is accessible to a wide body of language users.
What is less readily explained, however, is why discursive
language has tended to dominate the philosophical vocabulary,
while non-discursive or metaphorical uses have merely been
tolerated, or even ignored.

In the preface to his extensive

study of metaphor, Max Black states the prejudice well:
"To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle

him~like

praising a logician for his beautiful
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handwriting.

Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit,

on the principle that whereof one can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all. 1117 Such prime
offenders as Plato, Nietzsche and, of course Bergson himself,
are usually pardoned for their lapses into metaphor only to
the extent that their thought is bolstered by more sober,
discursive prose.
As a theorist and practitioner of philosophy, Bergson challenges this long standing prejudice by proposing a
mixed discourse, a blend of discursive and non-discursive
forms.

Bergson finds that the coexistence of these lin-

guistic forms in a single discourse is purposive.

In the

context of Bergson's philosophy. discursive language has the
advantage of providing literal descriptions of the world
which, however logically coherent and amenable to verification, fail to grasp objects in their fluidity and concreteness.

Non-discursive language, on the other hand, more ade-

quately expresses the universal duree, and yet its metaphorical and unconventional forms cannot be analyzed and
tested in discursive terms.

Neither discursive nor non-

discursive language alone can fulfill the philosopher's
twofold aim:

to describe and explain the world as it is,

and yet to do so in a language that withstands logical
scrutiny and analysis.

17 Black, Models and Metaphors , p . 2 5 .
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Anyone who has read a substantial portion of Bergson's work cannot help but sense a pervasive tension between
his strict adherence to straightforward discursive language
and his more liberal tendency to rely upon metaphoric express ions to support and confirm his philosophic insights.
This passage from Creative Evolution provides a clear example:
But evolution has actually taken place through millions
of individuals. on divergent lines, each ending at a
crossing from which new paths radiate, and so on indefinitely. If our hypothesis is justified . . . they
must keep something in common in spite of the divergence
of their effects, as school-fellows long separated keep
the same memories of boyhoocl.18
Bergson's description of the unity which underlies the divergent lines of evolutionary progress is heightened by its
metaphorical comparison to the bond of memories, which unify
old school-fellows whose paths have long since diverged.
Such interplay in Bergson's writings. between discursive
and non-discursive forms betrays not so much a conflict of
interests, as an uneasiness with wholeheartedly adopting
either conceptual scheme to the exclusion of the other.
This tendency to integrate rather than separate
the two forms of language has its negative and positive
aspects.

Just as Bergson has difficulty in accounting for

18 Bergson. Creative Evolution, p. 61. Italics mine.
Bergson's work is replete with similar examples. Sholom
Kahn. in his article "Henri Bergson's Method," isolates
several texts to illustrate the same point. (pp. 442-45)
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the complementarity of the analytic and intuitive methods,
so now he has failed to provide a grounding for the fact
that their different languages can express the same truth.
If discursive and non-discursive languages are untranslatable
one into the other as we have consistently shown, then at
most one can say they are expressing the same idea in different ways.

The question remains, however, whether an idea

expressed discursively or non-discursively is the same idea
at all. 19
Despite Bergson's inability to provide an adequate
foundation for his mixed discourse, his recommendation also
has a more positive side.

It contains an implicit challenge

to philosophers to broaden their conception of their own
discourse.

In addition to analyzing the syntactic and

semantic structures of ordinary discursive language, philosophers are urged to become more attentive to the workings
of metaphor, more adept at explicating the wealth of meaning
it embodies and more proficient in its use.
By recolillilending to philosophy that it adopt the
intuitive method, Bergson's objective is to extend and
deepen our comprehension of a world that analysis, with
its discursive forms, disfigures.

Despite the problems

which attend Bergson's theory of intuition, they should
not obscure his basic insight, that a new conceptual scheme

19 cf.

Chapter IV, pp. 128-30.
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and a new "languagen in which to express it can offer a
more complete, more accurate and more incisive view of the
world.

Whatever the final verdict on the intuitive method,

it has given rise to a reevaluation of expressive

forms~

urging the philosopher to be open to the semantic of the
artist and musician, while encouraging his own exploration
of the metaphorical uses of language.

Bergson's philosophy

of expression is the least developed, yet most visionary
aspect of his thought.

Therein he anticipates the concerns

of contemporary philosophers in his early recognition of the
urgent need for a revitalization of philosophic discourse.

r
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